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Abstract 
 
Because the cost of health care is increasing, more Americans are relying on 
crowdfunding to finance their health care expenses. Health care crowdfunding occurs when 
people seek donations through online crowdfunding platforms to pay for their health care costs. 
This thesis seeks to use theories in charitable giving and health care crowdfunding to understand 
if crowdfunding dollars are going to the people who need them most. Low-income individuals in 
non-Medicaid expansion states and patients with chronic diseases are not adequately covered by 
the private insurance market, thus they require the most need. However, donors evaluate need 
subjectively and are more likely to donate to those who are like them. As such, statistically 
analyzing GoFundMe campaigns reveals that crowdfunding campaigns for low-income 
individuals and chronically ill patients are less successful. These finding contribute to charitable 
giving literature in contextualizing a modern phenomenon within a rich body of private provision 
for basic goods theories. Moreover, they contribute to the health care crowdfunding literature by 
being the first study to test whether health care crowdfunding is addressing people with the 
greatest need for it. The implications for these findings are that health care crowdfunding falls 
short of addressing the market frictions of private insurance markets. Thus, crowdfunding is not 
a sustainable solution.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Recently the use of health care crowdfunding to finance individual health care expenses 
has increased. The fact that people are willing to resort to this mode of alternative financing is 
intriguing, because health care is a basic right, yet not everyone can access it. Thus, this thesis 
tries to understand whether this phenomenon is a response to addressing the market failures in 
the American health care market. Using GoFundMe data, I find that the data does not support the 
hypothesis that health care crowdfunding addresses market failure. Rather, the data suggest that 
health care crowdfunding perpetuates the failures.  
In doing so, this thesis contributes to the extensive charitable giving literature and the 
limited health care crowdfunding literature. To the charitable giving literature, this theory 
contributes to how online crowdfunding platforms interact with basic needs differently than that 
of traditional charitable giving mechanisms. To the limited health care crowdfunding literature, 
this is the first theory to assess whether crowdfunding is helping those with the greatest need in 
the United States. The findings are consistent with the existing literature in both fields. 
This thesis proceeds as follows. I begin with a background section on crowdfunding as a 
growing alternative in financing personal health care. I then provide an explanation of the 
historical events that led American’s health care system to rely heavily on the private market 
financing. I proceed to identify the three market frictions that prevent the private health 
insurance market from covering the health needs of all Americans. Next, I identify the two 
segments that are in the greatest need for alternative financing for health care: low-income 
individuals in non-Medicaid expansion states and individuals with chronic diseases. These two 
groups make up the demand-side of the health care crowdfunding market. Then, I outline the 
empirical literature on charitable giving and what it says about why people give to these causes. 
Yang 6 
 
Aggregating the findings on both demand- and supply-sides of the market, I arrive at two 
hypotheses. First, non-Medicaid expansion states will raise less money than Medicaid-expansion 
states. Second, chronic diseases will raise more money than acute diseases. Afterwards, I discuss 
my research methodology, which is based on an original dataset that I collected from 
GoFundMe. I collect a representative dataset by pooling campaigns from the curated page and 
keyword searches. I gather data on each campaign’s location, amount raised, target amount, and 
number of donors, shares, followers, and donations. Using statistical analysis, I show that there is 
supporting data for my first hypothesis. There is no supporting data for my second hypothesis. 
These empirical findings prompt me to conclude with a discussion of the results, their 
implications for the existing literature, and offer an alternative explanation. My results suggest 
that health care crowdfunding does not help those with the greatest health care needs. Thus, I 
conclude by encouraging policymakers to intervene and repair the frictions of the health market. 
II. Crowdfunding is a growing alternative in financing personal health care. 
 
In this section, I define health care crowdfunding, outline its relevant stakeholders, and 
conduct a market analysis highlighting the rapid growth of this activity. I proceed to highlight 
two overarching themes that are fundamental to the health care crowdfunding narrative. First, 
health care is a basic right. I explain this through the citation of the United Nations’ treaties and 
domestic public polls that find majority agreement that the government is responsible for 
ensuring access to health care coverage. Second, health care is unaffordable, because health care 
costs are rising, and left to their own devices, people are underinsured by the insurance plans 
they are subscribed to.  
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Health care crowdfunding occurs when people seek donations through online 
crowdfunding platforms to pay for their health care costs. Beneficiaries and donors make up the 
people participating in this crowdfunding transaction.  
Beneficiaries are people seeking donations, and they can be categorized as direct and 
indirect beneficiaries. Direct beneficiaries are the underinsured sick patient in need of financial 
aid to afford their health care. Indirect beneficiaries are the friends, relatives, and organizations 
that make the financial request and seek donations on behalf of the direct beneficiary. The 
expectation is they use the crowdfunded money to pay for the direct beneficiary’s treatment. 
Donors are people who donate money to fund the cause, and they can be divided into two 
groups. First, donors can be people who know the direct beneficiary, and as a result, donate to 
help. Examples include family members, friends, and colleagues. Second, donors can be 
strangers who are asked to donate or looking for causes to donate to. 
Campaigns are what get crowdfunded. Beneficiaries create campaigns to explain what 
happened to the person requesting the support, specify the amount the person needs for recovery. 
Campaigns can include pictures, videos, and status updates to engage potential donors. Donors 
donate to campaigns to help cover any portion of the beneficiary’s requested health care cost. 
For-profit platforms are where the crowdfunding – whether for health care or for other 
causes – happens. Online crowdfunding platforms leverage the reach of the Internet and 
connectivity of social media networks of its beneficiaries and donors to curate campaigns to a 
global audience. These platforms are managed by for-profit businesses, such as GoFundMe, 
Bonfire, and Indiegogo. Profit is the difference between revenue and costs. The revenues for 
these businesses come from platform fees, charged to the beneficiary as a fixed percentage of the 
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total amount raised. However, for personal campaigns, like those that fund individual health care 
costs, GoFundMe has dropped the platform fee and now just asks for voluntary tips. Using the 
same or slight deviations to this business model, 191 crowdfunding platforms have been started 
in the United States, followed by 44 in the United Kingdom. The proliferation of American 
businesses can be explained, in part, by growing American demand for crowdfunding for a 
variety of causes, from covering health care and education expenditure to funding a start-up and 
passion project. Management scholar Nir Kshetri finds that the US accounts for 72% of the 2013 
global crowdfunding market.1 And this demand is growing globally as Statista values the 2018 
crowdfunding market at $10.2 billion and forecasts a 2025 valuation of $28.8 billion.2  
Within crowdfunding, health care crowdfunding is growing rapidly. The evolving 
business of GoFundMe, the crowdfunding market leader, illustrates this trend. In 2010, 
GoFundMe launches as a crowdfunding platform for project ideas and wedding gifts – not health 
care. However, the company soon observes that the most funded campaigns on its platform are 
those covering personal health care expenses. More specifically, between 2010 and 2018, about 
one-third of all funded campaigns on its platform are health care campaigns. Annually, 
GoFundMe raises over $650 million for health care campaigns.3 I also find that $115,536,240 is 
raised across 5,596 GoFundMe health care campaigns in my original dataset. Thus, health care 
crowdfunding has grown rapidly to become a major part of the market leader’s crowdfunding 
activity. This demand is further illustrated in how GoFundMe has redesigned its platform and 
identified its acquisition targets. The business now has a prominent “Medical” category that 
curates its health care campaigns and claims to be the default platform for health care 
 
1 Kshetri 2015 
2 Szmigiera, 2019 
3 Bluth, 2019 
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crowdfunding needs. Moreover, GoFundMe has acquired YouCaring, a major competitor in 
health care crowdfunding, to consolidate its dominance in the health care crowdfunding space.4 
The core concept that underlies the value in online crowdfunding is that these platforms 
connect a large group of donors – of friends and strangers – with campaigns that can financially 
support its beneficiary. Because of the global reach of online networks, strangers from different 
socioeconomic classes can be connected to support someone in desperate need for help. I see this 
occur in the media. In November of 2018, 60-year old Missourian Hedda Martin is not qualified 
for a necessary heart transplant. The medical committee that rejected her transplant application, 
because she was underinsured and thus lacked a secure financial plan to pay for her post-
transplant recovery needs. The committee urges her to launch a fundraising effort to raise 
$10,000. So, Martin’s son creates a campaign on GoFundMe on her behalf. The campaign 
catches media attention. Moreover, it catches the attention of Representative Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez (AOC) in New York. AOC shares the information on her Twitter page to her 6.7 million 
followers. Over forty-four thousand dollars are crowdfunded, and Martin gets her transplant.5  
What is important to note in Martin’s story, which is representative of many others, are 
the two prevailing themes in the staple health care crowdfunding narrative: (1) people have a 
right to health care, and (2) health care is unaffordable. First, the right to health care is explained 
through both international community standards and domestic public opinion. Next, health care 
is unaffordable, because costs are increasing and people, left to their own devices, are 
underinsured.  
 
4 Lunden, 2018 
5 Keshner, 2018 
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While health care is a basic human right that has been recognized by most countries in 
the United Nations, this is not the case in United States. All industrialized countries have ratified 
the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 25 of the UDHR 
codifies the universal right to health. Subsequently, every industrialized nation except for the 
United States shifted to implementing universal health systems. While the treaty did not formally 
mandate the need for universal health systems, most of the international community recognize 
that to have health as a basic right meant also having access to a universal health system. An 
explicit effort is then made to codify the universal right to health care in Article 12 of UN’s 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural and Rights (CESCR). Specifically, the Article 
formally recognizes that “states must protect this right…through a comprehensive system of 
health care, which is available to everyone without discrimination, and economically accessible 
to all.”6 The treaty holds member states accountable for providing a health system that does not 
discriminate against people on the basis of cost. All member states signed the CESCR, but the 
United States was one of three countries that did not ratify it. But while health care is not a basic 
right in the United States, health is a universal basic right. Universal basic rights are fundamental 
rights that every human should have and codified by the international community. Since most of 
the international community recognizes the basic human right to health care, health care is a 
basic right for humans residing in the United States. 
There is strong bipartisan support in the mass public that access to health care coverage is 
a government responsibility. Pew Research Center finds that six-in-ten Americans continue to 
believe that ensuring health care coverage is a government responsibility. Even among the 37% 
who express disagreement, they still overwhelming support the continuance of government-run 
 
6 Gerisch, 2018 
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health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid.7 Thus, across partisan lines, there is an 
explicit and implied public consensus that people are entitled to health care coverage. And these 
opinions are operationalized in elections. According to the Gallup's October 2018 Midterm 
Election Benchmark poll, 80% of polled registered voters name health care as a very important 
policy topic they will consider in choosing who to vote for – placing health care above the policy 
domains of economy and immigration.8 Thus, voters care about health care as a policy area that 
deserves attention. Unsurprisingly, the Kaiser Family Foundations find that most Americans are 
concerned about access to health care due to costs.9 To quantify this concern, the Pew Research 
Center reveals that approximately 83% of Americans feel that health care costs are 
problematic.10. 
One reason the public think health care costs are problematic is that the costs are 
expensive. The 2018 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services report shows that the national 
health expenditure – how much the country spends on health care – grew by 4.6% from 2017, 
thereby amounting to approximately $3.6 trillion or 17.7% of gross domestic product (GDP). Out 
of pocket expenditure – how much people pay for health care using their own disposable 
incomes, because the insurance doesn’t cover it – grew by 2.8% to $375.6 billion. That is, out of 
pocket expenditures make up 10% of 2018’s national health expenditure.11 
People when left to their own devices are likely to be underinsured, and thus not have 
access to their ideal health coverage plans. In 2018, 91.5% of the population is insured.12 
 
7 Kiley, 2018 
8 Newport, 2018 
9 Kirzinger et al., 2019  
10 “Most Americans Say the High Costs of Medical Treatments Are a Big Problem,” 2018 
11 “NHE Fact Sheet,” 2020  
12 Berchick, 2019, p. 1 
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However, a survey on economic wellbeing by the Federal Reserve finds that 20% of adults had 
major, unexpected medical bills to pay in 2018. So, while most of the population is insured, one-
fifth of Americans are still facing unexpected medical expenses that were not covered by their 
insurance. Among this group, 40% had unpaid debt from those bills. The median range for these 
bills is between $1,000 and $4,999.13 Thus, the data suggest that Americans are underinsured, 
meaning that they purchased health insurance plans that fall short of meeting their actual health 
care needs.    
III. Historical events have led the United States to rely more on private health insurance. 
 
In this section, I explain the historical events that led the United States to rely more on 
private health insurance rather than government-provided insurance. While many winning 
presidential campaigned on expanding health care, their efforts – aside from that of Presidents 
Johnson and Obama – ultimately were not enacted due to shifting political priorities and interest 
group opposition. Over time, various legislations caused for-profit insurance firms to replace 
non-profits as the primary provider of insurance. The culmination of these events led up to the 
modern American reliance on private health insurance markets. 
Early twentieth-century advances in medicine increased demand for health care services. 
In his observations of the hospital setting, Dr. Benjamin Rush wrote: “Hospitals are the sinks of 
human life.”14 This description characterized what hospitals, as institutions of advanced 
medicine, were like before the early 20th century. Hospitals were funded by charity and provided 
health care to the poor. Hospitals were unsanitary and unsafe. The medical technology was 
rudimentary. Rather than working at hospitals to profit and practice advance medicine, 
 
13 “Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S Households in 2018 – May 2019,” 2019 
14 “THE RESULT OF OBSERVATIONS MADE UPON THE DISEASES WHICH OCCURRED IN THE Military 
Hospitals of the United States, DURING THE LATE WAR,” 1793, p. 184 
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physicians often volunteered at hospitals to train and gain clinical experience. They then 
leveraged their clinical experience to offer for-profit services to middle- and upper-
socioeconomic class patients. But even then, the value of medical treatments was limited. This 
changed following a series of inventions from anesthesia and X-rays to cleanliness practices. As 
a result, medicine in hospitals became more effective and safer. Doctors were able to use 
anesthesia to reduce pain during surgeries. X-rays improved the accuracy of diagnosis. 
Cleanliness practices reduced the spread of infectious diseases, thereby improving the overall 
quality of hospital care. These improvements generated greater and broader demand.  
Increased demand brought health care into the political spotlight, where candidates and 
organizations called for its provision through some degree of government involvement. Then-
presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt, running on a progressive platform, campaigned for 
universal health coverage in 1914. This was the first time a major presidential candidate put 
healthcare as a campaign issue on a national platform. Other non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) also tried to provide their members with health care access by working with 
government. For example, the American Association for Labor tried to develop health insurance 
programs with the help of state governments and labor unions.15 Thus, in the early stages of 
modern American health care, the public interest in having the government operationally 
involved with health care provision existed. 
However, World War I shifted the nation’s priorities away from health care reform, thus 
leaving opportunities for NGOs to satisfy unmet demand without government involvement. The 
government started to focus on preparing for war. Labor unions took this opportunity to 
 
15 Manchikanti et al., 2017, p. 108 
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prioritize recruitment and expansion. Health care was relegated to the sidelines, and existing 
efforts were halted. As a result, both Roosevelt and American Association for Labor’s healthcare 
efforts with federal and state governments, respectively, fell short.16 Nonetheless, the demand 
remained unfulfilled. Government was preoccupied with other priorities. Thus, NGOs had the 
opportunity to meet an existing demand without government involvement.  
Nonprofit hospitals became the best candidates to fulfill the unmet public demand, and 
they began the early development of the American health insurance market. Because nonprofit 
hospitals already had the medical infrastructure, they were best positioned to use their existing 
resources to meet the public demand. In 1929, while trying to make health care more accessible 
to his local community, Baylor University’s executive vice-president Justin Ford Kimball 
proposed a plan: Ask Dallas schoolteachers to pay six dollars a year to Baylor’s nonprofit 
university teaching hospital for 21 days of hospitalization coverage per year. The proposal 
effectively attracted local teachers, and the successful execution of this flat-rate prepaid model at 
Baylor prompted other nonprofit hospitals to learn and adopt.17 These payment plans were the 
early versions of health insurance plans. And while the proliferated adoption of these prepaid 
plans was rapid, the market was still in its early stages. Thus, the government could still have 
intervened.   
While the New Deal ushered in a mass expansion of the welfare state, health care was 
largely left out because of opposition by the American Medical Association (AMA). Demand for 
government provision of health care still existed. During the drafting of the Social Security Act, 
groups like the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care advocated to include health insurance as 
 
16 “The Role of the Federal Government in Health and Earlier Healthcare Efforts”, 2004, p. 30 
17 Weisbrod and Feiser, 1961 
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part of the bill. However, Democrat President Franklin D. Roosevelt ultimately removed health 
insurance from the Social Security Act primarily due to opposition from the AMA. The AMA 
opposed any type of health insurance, because it wanted to protect the power physicians had to 
independently charge for their services. Pricing power was important, because many physicians 
owned their practices. Each practice faced different cost structures due to different supplier 
relationships and business conditions. Thus, a key power they had was the ability to set their own 
prices for the value of their service. Health insurance would have removed this pricing power 
from physicians and given it to an external stakeholder, such as the government or hospitals. 
Thus, the AMA threatened to stop the passage of Roosevelt’s Social Security Act should the bill 
include one. And because of the size and effective organization of the AMA, its threat was 
credible.18 Thus, Roosevelt removed health care from the Social Security Act to ensure that the 
rest of the bill passed. This political power play in the health care policy field inhibited the 
expansion of government’s welfare role into health care, spurring the growth of nonprofit 
hospital health insurance plans. 
As nonprofit health insurance plans proliferated, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Associations pioneered the American health insurance marketplace. Two nonprofit associations, 
offering similar payment plans to the public, were founded around 1939: The Blue Cross 
Association and the Blue Shield Association. The Blue Cross Association was an association of 
nonprofit hospitals that were adopting payment plans like that of Baylor University’s. The Blue 
Cross plans were offered by hospitals to their community members who paid an annual fee – or 
premium – to access hospital care throughout the year. The plans increased demand for hospital 
services. This increase was concerning to physicians who feared competition from hospitals. 
 
18 “The Role of the Federal Government in Health and Earlier Healthcare Efforts,” 2004, p. 31 
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Thus, physicians established the Blue Shield Association to adopt similar prepayment insurance 
plans that covered home and office visits. The customers that subscribed to these plans also paid 
a premium in exchange for physician services. Thus, the early stages of the American health 
insurance market were defined by a duopoly between hospitals and physicians. These two market 
leaders both adopted community ratings that aimed to maximize the number of people who could 
access health care.  
Community ratings ensured that these nonprofit health insurers improved the accessibility 
of health care to the public’s growing demand for it. Community rating meant that premiums 
charged for the same level of coverage did not vary across individual circumstances. Everyone 
who paid the premium had access to the same level of coverage. Doing so, these organizations 
improved the accessibility of health care, so that hospitals and physicians could meet the 
growing demand for health care. Community rating improved accessibility, because it enabled 
cross-subsidization of healthcare costs between the sick and healthy, the poor and rich, and the 
elderly and youth. Consider the dynamics between the elderly and the youth. Assume that the 
elderly is more likely to get sick, thus the elderly would be costlier to the insurer. As a result, 
from a financial standpoint, the elderly should be charged more for the health insurance relative 
to the youth, because the elderly is more likely to use the insurance and are thus costlier. 
However, community ratings don’t consider individual health circumstances. They charged 
everyone the same premium for the same amount of services covered. This helped lower health 
care costs for the elderly by subsidizing the expenses of the elderly with the payments made by 
the youth. This cross-subsidization made health care more accessible to the elderly and the sick. 
However, to sustain this model, insurers must have a continuous inflow of the young and 
healthy, and the proportion of young and healthy must exceed the elderly and sick. But the 
Yang 17 
 
problem was that young and healthy people may not necessarily value insurance at the price 
charged. Thus, the community rating model was vulnerable to any competition that could offer 
similar insurance products at lower prices. 
The community rating models failed to compete against more competitively priced plans 
charged by for-profit insurers who used experience rating pricing models. The proof-of-concept 
provided by nonprofit Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans prompted large industrial employers and 
once hesitant for-profit commerical insurance companies to enter the health insurance 
marketplace around 1941. Some large employers provided integrated healthcare systems. These 
systems employed a network of health care providers and offered health insurance to members 
within the company’s employee community. Kaiser Permanente, founded in 1942, was one of 
them. Meanwhile, commercial insurance companies also entered the health insurance market as 
for-profit businesses. They entered with existing insurance businesses that spanned both the 
scope of coverage, so covering life insurance and other domains of insurance, and geography, so 
providing nationwide coverage. Because of their profit maximization objectives, they wanted to 
reduce costs and maximize revenues. Thus, they were incentivized to abandon community rating 
used by prevailing nonprofit health insurance for experience rating. Experience rating charged 
customers based on their individual risk of becoming sick. Effectively, this model enabled 
insurance companies to discriminate health care access based on a customer’s riskiness and 
relatedly, their ability to pay. As such, the sick and elderly would either be charged at a higher 
price than the healthy young or be not eligible for insurance coverage. And the high price might 
not be affordable if the sick and elderly were also poor. Thus, each customer was priced 
differently for the same set of covered services in the health insurance plan they subscribed to. 
This allowed companies to offer a variety of health insurance plans across a range of prices to 
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target different customer segments with different levels of risk. Specifically, for the young and 
healthy, for-profit insurers offered lower-cost plans with less services covered. This cheaper 
option effectively deterred young and healthy customers away from Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield’s community rated plans. The loss of young and healthy inflows of people into 
community rated plans forced the nonprofit model that focused on maximizing health care access 
to become obsolete.19 
Around the same time, in 1942, the Stabilization Act increased demand for employer-
sponsored health insurance by leaving employers to compete for workers with fringe benefits. To 
stabilize inflation, Congress passed the Stabilization Act to prevent employers from competing 
for employees based on wages as there was a scarcity of avaliable workers. Employers could 
however compete for employees by offering more competitive fringe benefit packages that did 
not exceed 5% of wages. Meanwhile, health care demand was growing, and for-profit insurers 
were beginning to offer low-cost insurance plans for the healthy. Thus, employers knew that 
people wanted health care, and that the cost of healthcare plans would probably be cheap, as 
people who work are generally healthy. So, employers who did not want to create integrated 
health systems decided to work with private insurance companies to offer employer-sponsored 
health insurance plans as fringe benefits. Employees responded positively to the offering, and 
this resulted in employer-sponsored health insurance becoming a critical means of how many 
Americans received their health insurance. In 2018, the United States Census Bureau calculated 
that approximately 55.1% of the population had employer-sponsored health insurance.20 
 
19 Manchikanti et al., 2017  
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Then, the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945 ceded federal regulatory power over insurance 
markets to states, thereby decentralizing any significant federal regulatory power over health 
insurance markets. This federal law exempted private insurers from federal regulation.21 It 
prevented the federal government from regulating pricing, coverage, and other features of health 
insurance. As a result of the bill, each state was given authority to regulate the health insurance 
market within their borders. This decentralization generated a variety of outcomes for health 
insurers as states varied in their approach to regulation. Some states take advantage of their 
power to force insurance companies to only operate within their borders and encouraged the 
development of regional monopolies. Meanwhile other states removed all regulations on 
competition and made companies compete in the free market. As a result, the private health 
insurance marketplace became extremely fragmented. 
Next, in 1954, the government began to indirectly subsidize the private insurance market 
through tax breaks, which increased public reliance on private health insurance. In 1954, the IRS 
issued tax breaks on employer contributions, which included the contributions made to 
employer-sponsored healthcare plans.22 This altered incentives on wages. For every dollar an 
employee earned, there was an economic incentive to invest that dollar into the employer-
sponsored health insurance plan rather than to withdraw it as money. Thus, assuming that people 
were indifferent to the benefit derived from either option, the withdrawl would be taxed while 
the investment would not. As a result, employer contributions into sponsored-health insurance 
plans were financially valued more in the short-term. Employees recognized this incentive and 
demanded more employer-contributions into their health insurance plans. Employers spent more 
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on employer-sponsored health insurance. American workers then became even more reliant on 
private insurance. And this reliance is in part encouraged by the government’s indirect 
subsidization of private health insurance markets. Economist Jonathan Gruber projected that this 
tax break was worth approximately $260 billion.23 
Then in 1974, the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) exempted self-insured, 
multi-state employers from state regulations on health insurance, thus prompting cost-cutting 
actions and underinsurance effects. ERISA was not passed with the intention to impact the 
healthcare market. However, the act in practice pre-empted state regulation of self-insured, 
multi-state employers. As a result, multi-state employers did not have to abide by state laws in 
choosing which health insurance packages they offered their employees. This change led to the 
undermining of a centralized government oversight over the health insurance market to regulate 
key insurance elements such as pricing and coverage. This was even more problematic when 
considering the large inconsistencies in health insurance plans left behind by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.24. Left to their own devices, for-profit employers, seeking to lower health care 
costs, worked with for-profit insurers to commercialize health care. This unregulated cost-cutting 
effort created ample opportunities to underinsure the American working class who relied on 
health insurance through their employers. Effectively, employers and their insurers took this 
opportunity to cover less services and a smaller proportion of health care costs. The 
consequential impact on the American working class was that more people became underinsured, 
and thus their out-of-pocket health care expenses increased.  
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As these policies passed and the private market matured, many winning presidents 
campaigned on the issue of health care, but their platforms were ultimately not enacted. President 
Harry S. Truman called for a compulsory national health insurance program that would be 
funded by a 1.5% payroll tax. While Truman won the election, he was not able to leverage his 
public support to pass his healthcare proposal, because of active opposition from the AMA.25 
Then in 1960, Democrat Senator John F. Kennedy campaigned on adding a health care 
amendment to the Social Security Act. While victorious in his presidential election, President 
Kennedy lacked support from Congress to pursue a major comprehensive health care reform bill. 
The federal government finally made headway when President Johnson passed Medicare 
and Medicaid in 1965 through a bipartisan compromise. Following President Kennedy’s 
assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson passed the Medicare and Medicaid bills to create a 
government-provided healthcare system for the general American public. Medicare was a two-
part bill passed based on a bipartisan compromise and drew upon the legacies of the Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield plans. Drawing upon past Democratic proposals, Medicare Part A covered 
hospital services and was financed through a payroll tax. Based on past Republican proposals, 
Medicare Part B covered physician services and was financed by two revenue streams: enrollee 
premiums and general government revenue. These programs significantly expanded public 
access to health care. Medicaid, on the other hand, capitalized on this momentum to insure the 
qualified low-income and vulnerable populations that otherwise would have been uninsured. 
Medicaid was financed through public dollars and required state-buy, which it did not always 
have.26 
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Rather than pursue more reforms of health care and despite bipartisan interest on the 
issue, subsequent administrations relegated health care to a secondary issue. Legislators from 
both Republican and Democrat parties introduced several proposals between the 1970s and into 
the early 1990s, proposing different versions of national health insurance programs financed by 
payroll taxes, general federal revenues, and instituting individual mandates. None succeeded, 
because health care was no longer viewed as a primary policy concern.27 
President Clinton succeeded in reviving health care as a primary issue for the modern 
century. In 1992, Bill J. Clinton campaigned on health care as a priority for his administration. 
Like many of his predecessors, he failed to deliver a comprehensive healthcare reform. Despite 
this policy failure, the Clinton administration’s focus on health care revived health care as a 
primary policy issue for subsequent administrations to focus on.28 
President Obama managed to make major headway in reforming an increasingly costly 
health insurance market with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA). President Barack Obama campaigned on and then passed the ACA in 2010, advancing a 
major marketplace reform on the American health insurance market. The ACA reinstituted 
community ratings, banned market discrimination against enrollees with pre-existing conditions, 
expanded Medicaid upon state buy-in, and closed gaps in what services were not being 
sufficiently covered by Medicare. Moreover, the government mandated ten essential health 
benefits that the plans on the ACA marketplace must cover, thus regaining some centralized 
 
27 Manchikanti et al., 2017 
28 Igel, 2008 
Yang 23 
 
regulatory authority. This new regulatory power was awarded to federal and state agencies to 
ensure progress in advancing health care’s quality, access, and coverage.29  
The subsequent challenges to the ACA showed the controversies surrounding health care 
reform that delay significant changes to the health care market. In 2012, the ACA was 
challenged in the Supreme Court over two of its features: the individual mandate and its promise 
to withhold existing federal financial support to states that don’t expand Medicaid. The 
individual mandate taxed uninsured individuals to coerce people into buying health insurance.  
The latter feature was designed to coerce states into expanding Medicaid using federal dollars. 
The former was ruled as constitutional on the grounds that the financial penalty was 
fundamentally a tax, and Congress had taxation power. The latter failed to hold up in court, 
because Congress was not authorized to force states to accept Medicaid expansion.30 The ACA 
was challenged again in the courts in 2015 and 2019.31 Even in the legislative branch, in 2017, a 
Republican Congress attempted but failed to pass an ACA repeal bill and an ACA-replacement 
bill. The replacement bill was intended to better align with Republican values for health care 
reform.32 Thus, health care reform was not only difficult to pass, but it was also difficult to keep. 
The ACA was still challenged on Constitutional and ideological grounds years after its passage 
in 2010. And thus, health care remained a controversial topic and efforts to reform it at the 
government-level remain difficult if not unfruitful. 
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IV. There are three market frictions that prevent the private health insurance market from 
covering the health needs of all Americans. 
 
In this section, I explore the three market frictions that prevent the private health 
insurance market from covering the health needs of all Americans. First, existing contingent 
contract markets discourage the provision of coverage for individuals, especially those who are 
low-income. Second, adverse selection deters insurers from covering high-risk customers. Third, 
moral hazard effects increase the aggregate cost of health care, which exacerbates the 
affordability problems that then may deter even more Americans from getting insurance through 
the private market. 
i. Existing contingent contracts are limited and biased against individuals. 
 
The nature of health care requires that it be insured through a market of contingent 
contracts. However, large groups are necessary to reduce high administrative costs faced by 
insurers. Thus, individuals that lack access to these groups tend to be excluded by the market. 
The technical and uncertain nature of health care requires its insurance to be provided for 
through a market of contingent contracts. When economist Kenneth J. Arrow in 1963 discusses 
contingent contracts, he argues that an optimal market for contingent contracts must exist, 
because health care requires complex technical knowledge to understand. And even with mastery 
of the technical knowledge, health care is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Thus, 
Arrow says that contingent contracts are necessary to meet customer demand for health care. 
These contracts take effect when certain conditions specified in the contract are met. The 
contingent contract market should ideally allow customers to choose from any combination of 
prespecified services, prices, and providers.33 
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However, insurers are incentivized to capitalize on economies of scale to reduce 
significant administrative costs associated with health insurance provision. The ideal market 
effectively requires an individualized approach, which is administratively difficult and costly to 
operate on. Health economist Michael Chernew notes that writing, coordinating, verifying and 
operating individualized contingent contracts would require an abundance of work and incur 
high administrative costs.34 As such, Arrow emphasizes that insurers are incentivized to exploit 
administrative costs by spreading the costs across large groups.35 Hence, insurers were 
incentivized to meet demand for employer-sponsored insurance plans in the 1940s when 
employers began offering healthcare benefits to their employees. With the employer’s input, 
prespecified health insurance plans were offered to a large group of employees. These insured 
employees are generally homogenous. Since they are working, they are most likely healthy. As a 
result, insurers can generally expect these people to be less costly. Consequently, theses cost-
savings are passed on to employers who pass it down to their employees. This process generates 
a general alignment of interests that incentivize insurers to cover groups. 
Thus, individuals tend to be left out of the health insurance market. Health economist 
Sherry Glied notes that Arrow’s research implies that people who do not have direct access to 
employer-sponsored health insurance also lack individual coverage.36 The United States Census 
Bureau finds supporting evidence for this implication; the average uninsured American is 
expected to be a low-income, working male without a high school diploma and between the ages 
of 19-64.37 Underlying both the theory and uninsured profile is an acknowledgement that not all 
employers provide health insurance to their employees. Thus, for those employees, they are left 
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to their own devices. If limited to the private market, then these individuals are likely to lack 
individual coverage. Leveraging the profile of the average uninsured American worker, these 
individuals tend to be low-income. While insurers do offer health insurance plans for individuals 
on the marketplace, the cost of individual plans may be prohibitively unaffordable. Thus, the 
health needs of individuals – especially low-income individuals – who cannot pay for the plans 
on the marketplace tend not be met by the private health insurance market. However, even with 
the avaliable contingent contracts offered by the private market, adverse selection adds another 
friction in limiting who gets served by the private market.  
ii. Adverse selection deters high-risk individuals from getting private health insurance. 
 
High-risk customers often rely more on higher-priced, but more generous health 
insurance plans. Thus, they are more likely to opt-in to and adversely select costlier health 
insurance plans. However, because they are costly to insurers, insurers are incentivized to 
uninsured or not insurance them at all. 
Choice in private health insurance markets allow for adverse selection. Adverse selection 
occurs when sick people choose generous insurance plans. In private health insurance markets, 
customers can choose which plans they purchase based on their health needs and willingness to 
pay. The coverage provided by different plans differ in what services are covered and how much 
these services are covered by. For example, a low-cost plan may cover dental and vision services 
but only cover those services up to 10% of their retail price. Alternatively, a generous, more-
expensive plan may cover a breadth of services and 100% of the cost for those service. As such, 
people who are either sick or at a high-risk of becoming sick are more likely to need more health 
services. So relative to healthy people, they are more likely to buy a more generous health 
Yang 27 
 
insurance plan.38 This adverse selection results in the separation of sick or high-risk customers 
from healthy or low-risk customers. The overconcentration of high-risk customers in already 
costly plans leads insurers to charge disproportionately higher prices for the plans.  
Insurers are also incentivized to reduce the cost of high-risk customers and thus deter 
them from enrolling into these generous plans. To control the quality of customers within their 
plans, insurers engage in the process called risk selection. Within employer-sponsored health 
insurance, insurers could institute onerous processes for referrals to specialty services or require 
users to make a large portion of their health care costs out-of-pocket. These mechanisms 
effectively discourage high-risk customers from purchasing generous insurance packages.39 
As such, the deterrence measures instituted by private insurers constrain the extent to 
which the private health insurance market can meet the needs for high-risk customers. Those 
who do purchase a plan may end up underinsured, because the coverage is inadequate. Other 
high-risk people may be discouraged to purchase and become uninsured.40 Either way, the 
outcomes are suboptimal, such that the private health insurance markets fall short in meeting the 
health needs of high-risk people. 
iii. Moral hazard increases the cost burden for all Americans, thus limiting the reach of 
private markets to serving only those who can afford it. 
 
Even for those who purchase private market health insurance plans, the friction of moral 
hazard leads to an aggregate increase in prices for health care. Much of the literature on 
insurance markets is devoted to moral hazard. In health insurance, moral hazard occurs when the 
insured begin engaging in risky health behaviors, after they purchase health insurance. This 
increased usage increases aggregate health care costs. Arrow observes that widespread health 
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insurance increases demand for health care.41 Glied further expands that the expanded scope of 
services covered by health insurance has increased health expenditure, because of moral hazard 
effects.42 The people buying insurance are using more health care services, which are covered by 
their insurance. Increased demand prompts doctors and hospitals to charge higher prices since 
the supply of health care is not growing as quickly. As medical technologies improve, the health 
care quality increases, which further contribute to price increases.43 These increases are paid for 
by insurers. To avoid bankruptcy, insurers then increase their prices to offset growing health care 
expenses. In aggregate, health expenditure increases. 
Insurers have implemented mechanisms to reduce the moral hazard effects, but average 
consumers are not aware of those mechanisms at the time of purchase. Insurers are increasing the 
amount customers pay before the insurance takes effect. However, average Americans may not 
be aware of these features at the time of purchase. A group of health economists find that only 
14% of a nationally representative sample could correctly answer four multiple choice questions 
that tested the basic features of health insurance plans.44 Moreover, insurers have also added 
supply-side cost-sharing measures that limit the excessive use of health care by providers. The 
measures include utilization monitoring to deter physicians from oversupplying health services.45  
However, moral hazard effects persist in the private market, increasing health 
expenditure and thereby risk leaving behind people overwhelmed by its costs. Glied concludes 
that issues of moral hazard persist in the health insurance market today. Furthermore, the 
advances in medical technology have increased both the quality and cost of health care. Faced 
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with prohibitively expensive costs, more Americans are either opting into cheaper plans that 
leave them underinsured or out of the private market. Thus, the heightened cost of health care 
exacerbates the market’s failure in extending health coverage to more Americans.46 
V. Low-income and high-risk Americans will have the greatest need for additional support 
for health care expenses outside of the private insurance market. 
 
In this section, I explain that low-income and high-risk Americans will have the greatest 
need for alternative financing mechanisms like crowdfunding. Namely, I first explain how 
existing contingent contract effects and the incomplete expansion of Medicaid under the ACA 
leave a significant portion of low-income individuals uninsured. Without support from the 
private insurance market and being ineligible for public coverage, these individuals have a great 
need for an alternative means to affording health care. Second, I explain how the costliness of 
high-risk, primarily chronically ill individuals, leave many of these individuals sick and 
uninsured or underinsured. As a result, they will also be in great need for additional support. 
i. Among those impaired by income, low-income Americans in non-ACA Medicaid 
expansion states are in greatest need for additional support. 
 
Income remains a barrier in access to the private health insurance market, because of 
existing contingent contracts and moral hazard effects. Existing contingent contracts often create 
significant price disparities between employer-sponsored health insurance plans and individual 
plans. Namely, because individual plans cannot capitalize on the economies of scale that 
employer-sponsored plans can, individual plans on the private markets are expensive. Their costs 
are further exacerbated as a result of the cost increases through moral hazard effects. Moral 
hazard incentivizes the insured to overutilize the health care system, thereby increasing health 
expenditure. 
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Confronting high health care costs, low-income workers are most vulnerable to being 
uninsured by the private market. Low-income workers often either lack access to job-based 
coverage or the disposable income needed to pay for employer-sponsored insurance plans. Thus, 
within the private market, they are left to individual insurance plans, of which the majority often 
cannot afford. In 2018, the United States Census Bureau estimates that only 24.7% of low-
income people, categorized by those who make below 138% of the federal poverty line, had 
private insurance. This percent is almost triple that of the national average of 67.3%.47 Thus, 
low-income individuals have difficulty seeking coverage through the private insurance market.48 
As a result, low income workers can either attempt to get health insurance through the public 
market or be uninsured. 
However, the public market is limited in its coverage for low-income workers, because of 
means-tested features associated with traditional Medicaid and lack of state opt-in to ACA 
Medicaid expansion. Traditional Medicaid, passed by President Johnson’s administration in 
1965, has stringent eligibility requirements for adults. In most states, regardless of income, adults 
without dependent children are not eligible for Medicaid, unless they were disabled or 
pregnant.49 Thus, up until the passage of the ACA, most low-income, working class Americans – 
especially males – did not have access to Medicaid. The ACA allows states to opt-in to an 
expanded Medicaid program that makes all adults who make below 138% of the federal poverty 
line eligible for Medicaid. Such an expansion significantly expands the public market coverage 
for low-income individuals. However, states must opt-in to this expansion, and not all states 
have. In 2020, 15 states have not implemented Medicaid expansion.50 Thus, while the remaining 
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states have now expanded Medicaid to cover low-income adults, 15 states are still withholding 
public market coverage from them. Consequently, this lack of Medicaid-expansion leaves low-
income workers in those states uninsured.  
As a result, low-income workers in non-Medicaid expansion states have one of the 
greatest needs for additional health financing mechanisms. In 2018, the uninsured rate for adults 
who make below 100% of the federal poverty line in non-expansion states is 35.6%. This rate for 
Medicaid expansion states is 16.9%, which is merits to almost a 50% reduction.51 Meanwhile, 
the lack of insurance has adverse impacts on the uninsured population. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation finds that the uninsured are less likely to receive preventative care, and services for 
major health problems and chronic care.52 As a result of neglecting care, they end up suffering 
from major health consequences, that are even more costly to treat. Thus, low-income workers in 
non-expansion states demonstrate great need for alternative healthcare financing.  
ii. Among those impaired by the cost burden of their health needs, high-risk chronically ill 
Americans are in the greatest need for additional support. 
 
 Additionally, high-risk Americans also have a greater demand for alternative financing 
because of adverse selection effects. Adverse selection can result in the segregation of customers 
by their likelihood of getting sick. Thus, customers who are more likely to get sick will be more 
likely to opt into more generous health insurance plans. However, the coverage of these plans 
cost more, and because sick people are more likely to use the services, these plans are also 
costlier to manage. Moreover, insurers are incentivized to reduce costs and thus add insurance 
features that deter high-risk individuals from the private insurance market. 
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 A prominent group of high-risk Americans are those with chronic diseases, because they 
are highly prevalent, deadly, and expensive. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) defines chronic diseases as health conditions that last over a year. These patients may also 
require ongoing medical attention or be functionally impaired from day-to-day activities. Sixty 
percent of American adults have a chronic disease and 40% have two or more. Thus, chronic 
diseases are highly prevalent within the American population. Moreover, these diseases are 
deadly. Chronic diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes are the leading causes of 
death in the United States. And given the diseases’ prevalence and severity, measures to contain 
them also contribute heavily to the nation’s growing annual health expenditure.53 
Because chronic diseases are costly, the private insurance market is incentivized to 
reduce costs by deterring customers with chronic diseases from buying insurance. Some 
deterrence mechanisms are increasing premiums, deductibles, or copayments. Premiums are the 
monthly or annual rates customers pay upfront to purchase health insurance. Deductibles define a 
minimum cost of care that individuals need to exceed before they can access their insurance 
benefits. Copayments are fixed amounts individuals pay to the medical service provider before 
accessing health care. These mechanisms effectively increase the cost of health care upfront for 
the individual. Thereby, they discourage patients with chronic diseases from engaging in the 
private insurance market.54 Patients either exit and become uninsured by the private market or 
opt-in to a suboptimal insurance plan.  
Chronic diseases adversely impact a significant portion of the uninsured. Analyzing 
longitudinal data from the National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey, Dr. Andrew P. 
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Wilper estimates that approximately one-third of the uninsured population have chronic 
diseases.55 In other words, a significant portion of the uninsured are at a high-risk of becoming 
fatally sick. Thus, the demand for health care services to manage or prevent the onset of their 
chronic diseases exists. However, because these patients are uninsured, they are less likely to 
access the recommended care necessary to manage the disease. 
Even for insured individuals with chronic diseases, they are likely to defer from seeking 
necessary health care because of underinsurance. This issue is particularly relevant among 
insured cancer patients. Over one-third of insured cancer treatments face higher than expected 
out-of-pocket costs for their anticancer therapy. Among this group, the underinsured are most 
impacted, because they are charged almost one-third of their income.56 Thus, underinsurance 
leads to higher than expected health care costs for insured patients who need health care. As a 
result of underinsurance, and its subsequent costs, uninsured people are also less likely to get the 
care necessary to manage their disease. A large body of underinsurance literature concludes that 
the underinsured are less likely to get the care they need. For example, a Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) study on underinsurance among adults with hypertension, a major 
risk factor for heart disease, finds that 26% of adults with hypertension are underinsured. 
Compared to their adequately insured counterparts, underinsured adults fail to receive the 
recommended health care needed.57 As a result, their conditions progress unmanaged. 
However, the unmanaged progression of the chronic disease inevitably leaves these 
individuals with prohibitive health expenditures that require alternative financing channels to pay 
off. Because uninsured and underinsured individuals are deterred from accessing the necessary 
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health care to treat their disease, the disease naturally progresses. The unmanaged progression of 
the disease ultimately impairs these individuals to seek emergency health care. As a result, these 
individuals are most likely to consider the emergency department as their primary care site – as a 
last resort. However, emergency health care is expensive. Because the patient is inadequately 
covered by insurance, the charges that result from emergency health care are often 
unaffordable.58 Thus, these individuals will be in great need for alternative outlets – like 
crowdfunding – to raise money to pay off their medical expenses. 
VI. Charitable giving literature explains the supply of crowdfunds. 
 
In this section, I explore the literature on charitable giving and health care crowdfunding 
to identify why people give to health care crowdfunding campaigns, which make up the supply 
for crowd-sourced funding. Americans, relative to their OECD neighbors, rely heavily on 
charitable giving to provide for basic goods, like health care. This phenomenon can be in part 
explained by the prevailing view of encouraging private provision through charity. More 
precisely, this phenomenon can be explained at the individual level through eight reasons that 
motivate giving to health care crowdfunding campaigns. 
Charitable giving plays a larger role in meeting social needs in the United States than in 
other OECD countries. Public policy economist Charles T. Clotfelter observes that Americans 
have consistently given approximately 2% of their income to nonprofit organizations. And this 
private provision, or charity, has been primarily responsible for the country’s provision for social 
needs. American charitable giving is significantly higher than that of its OECD neighbors. 
Private provision of social needs in the United States makes up 10.5% of its GDP, while private 
provision of social needs averaged across all OECD countries makes up 2.5% of their GDP. The 
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role of charity is so significant that despite comparatively low government social expenditure, 
the United States ranks second in aggregate social expenditure. Individual charitable giving 
overwhelmingly makes up for what the government does not spend. Clotfelter concludes that this 
trend is persistent. Furthermore, the persistence of this trend makes Americans, relative to their 
OECD neighbors, rely more on private provision to address unmet social needs rather than 
government.59 
Given the significant role charity plays in the social landscape, the topic of how the 
government should manage charity has been deeply debated among policymakers and political 
philosophers. They organize their views into three schools of thought. 
One school argues that the government should constrain charity but recognizes that 
charity’s role in society cannot be reduced. This school is built on the theories by philosophers 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. They fundamentally argue that government has 
been entrusted with the authority to represent the interests of the common people. Charity, 
provided by individuals to advance their own interests, can undermine the interests of the 
common people. Thus, government has the authority to constrain charity. However, this school 
also acknowledges that charity plays a significant role in American society that charity cannot be 
removed. And thus, they acknowledge that they cannot prevent charity and are limited in how 
much they can constrain charity.60 As such, the subsequent two schools are more prevalent in 
shaping America’s charity landscape. 
Another school argues that the government should protect charity, acknowledging 
people’s interest in providing for the general welfare. This school is built on the theories of 
philosopher John Locke, who argues that charity is a property right that citizens are legally 
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entitled to. Assuming that people are social beings, Locke believes that people are interested in 
and have the rights to protect their individual interests and mankind’s interests. Mankind’s 
interests are those that help sustain and improve society. 61 As such, these interests include 
providing for basic needs and access to basic rights. Thus, people have the right to provide, 
through charity, for the basic needs of society to whatever extent possible without infringing 
upon the rights of others.  
The third and prevailing school argues that the government should encourage charity, 
because it allows the United States to be a successful pluralist democracy. This school is built on 
the theories of philosophers Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville. Burke observes that 
within civil society, small communities form, because of shared interests. These interests can 
include charitable giving and private provision for basic needs. These small communities 
strengthen their members’ ties to the larger civil society. Tocqueville extends this argument by 
attributing the success of the American polity to the formation of charity-supported associations. 
More specifically, charity helps sustain minority communities and opinions. Their existence 
enables a robust pluralist American democracy. 62 Thus, members in this school acknowledge 
that charity helps advance individual or small-group interests that deviate from the interests of 
the general public. However, Tocqueville credits this plurality of interests as key to the success 
of American democracy. And Tocqueville’s view is the most referenced in charitable giving 
literature. 
Charitable giving literature studies motivations for why people give to charity and its 
subsequent implications. Sociologists René Bekkers and Pamala Wiepking analyze the recent 
literature to summarize eight factors that motivate charitable giving: awareness of need; 
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solicitation; costs; reputation; value-alignment, efficacy; altruism; and warm-glow effects.63 The 
first four will explain why people donate to a variety of causes on crowdfunding platforms. 
Then, the next four will explain why people donate to health care campaigns. 
i. People donate on crowdfunding platforms, because these platforms raise awareness of 
need, solicit donors to donate, lower donation costs, and generate reputation boosts. 
 
First, people donate, because they subjectively perceive and understand what is needed. 
This need can be material, psychological, or social. Awareness can be raised through media 
exposure. Communications scholar Adam F. Simon finds that media coverage on the need 
directly correlates with how many donations the need gets.64 But while what the need is and how 
it raises awareness is important, the donor’s subjective perception of the need is most important. 
Social psychologists Carl Wagner and Ladd Wheeler find that subjective perceptions of need are 
directly correlated to if they donate and the amount they donate.65 
Subjective perceptions of need can be influenced by the similar-to-me bias, which then 
motivate donors to give to people who are like them. The similar-to me bias occurs when people 
favor others who are similar to them. Psychologists Deborah Small and Uri Simonsohn find that 
donors are more likely to donate if the person asking for the donation is similar to the donor – 
even if the donor has not been directly exposed to the person asking.66 Sociologist René Bekkers 
observes a similar effect in which donors who have relatives dealing with similar illnesses are 
more likely to donate to others who are also fighting those illnesses.67 By finding similarities 
with the beneficiary, donors are then more likely to perceive the beneficiary’s need as a 
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significant need. As such, this line of findings suggests that donors are likely to donate to those 
who the donor can relate with. 
Thus, the first reason people donate to crowdfunding platforms is that the platform raises 
awareness on people’s needs and allows for donors to find needs they can relate to. 
Crowdfunding platforms curate a wide variety potential needs from education and health care to 
passion projects and movie equipment. Communications scholar Elizabeth Crisp Crawford 
echoes this need among donors to find a more localized, comprehensively engaging, and 
personalized approach to charity.68 Moreover, all campaigns can be searched for through 
keywords and evaluated based on their content. The keyword searches allow donors to find 
campaigns for causes donors care about. The content on campaigns allows donors to find 
similarities with the beneficiary that then motivate the act of donating. Stories enable this 
opportunity for donors to become more aware and help people like themselves. Thus, storytelling 
becomes key in motivating donors to donate. Communications scholar, Amy Gonzales, observes 
that donors are more likely to donate to campaigns that told more personal stories that better 
connected with donors.69 As such, because of these design features, crowdfunding helps donors 
become more aware of needs and find needs that they can relate to. 
Second, people donate if solicited to donate. According to the 2001 Independent Sector 
survey on Giving and Volunteering, about 57.7% of donors donated after being asked to.70 Social 
psychologist Svenn Lindskold observes that reaching out and asking potential donors to donate 
increases the likelihood that people donate.71 This effect remains meaningful in social media.  
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Solicitations on social media networks are also effective in increasing donation behavior. 
Communication scholars Jingyuan Shi and Charles T. Salmon observe that local opinion leaders 
can significantly influence their followers and members within their social networks to donate by 
retweeting.72 Thus, retweeting and other methods sharing people’s solicitations on social media 
networks can also impact donation behavior. 
As such, the second reason people donate to crowdfunding platforms is that people can 
be solicited through social media to donate. Every crowdfunding campaign page gives viewers 
the option to share the campaigns onto their social media channels. Thereby, the beneficiary and 
those supporting the beneficiary can solicit their social media networks to donate. 
Communications scholar Elizabeth Crisp Crawford highlights that crowdfunding platforms have 
gained popular adoption by enabling peer-to-peer advocacy.73 The shareability of campaigns on 
crowdfunding platforms to online social networks help scale and ease the solicitation process, 
which then drives donations. 
Third, people donate if costs are low. Costs of donating can range from the donation 
amount asked for to the platform fees of processing the donation. If the requested donation 
amount is high, then the amount becomes costly to the donor. As a result, the donor will be 
discouraged people from donating. Thus, lowering donation costs can increase the likelihood of 
donations. In their field experiment, economists Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman find 
that lowering costs of making donations increases the likelihood people donate.74 
By lowering donation costs, crowdfunding encourages donation behavior. Crowdfunding 
varies from traditional donation channels in that people have a lot of flexibility in deciding how 
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much they will donate. Moreover, platform fees are either accounted for in the aggregate amount 
the beneficiary requests or not charged for personal crowdfunding campaigns. As a result, by 
extending the logic that donors donate if costs are low, and crowdfunding lowers costs, then 
donors are encouraged to donate through crowdfunding. 
Fourth, people donate if donating improves their reputation. Researchers René Bekkers 
and Theo Schuyt observe that donations are strongly associated with measures of social 
pressure.75 A measure of social pressure is reputation among peers. Pscyhologist J. T. 
Muehleman finds that people donate to causes that are perceived to be good by their peers. 
Doing so helps their peers see the donor in a positive light, which then helps improve the donor’s 
reputation among their peers.76 Thus, people donate to improve their reputation. Furthering the 
research, psychologists Phillip Brickman and James Bryan observe that people are more likely to 
donate if they perceive the donation as a means of reducing inequality. Donating to an 
inequality-reducing is perceived as a positive activity.77 
To reap the reputation rewards, donors prefer to make their donations public, which can 
be easily done through crowdfunding platforms. Charitable giving economists James Andreoni 
and Ragan Petrie observe that people prefer to publicize their donations, so that their peers are 
aware of their donation.78 Only when their peers become aware of their donation can they enjoy 
the reputation boosting rewards that result from making the donation. As such, donors are 
attracted to charitable giving channels that allow them to publicize their donation. Crowdfunding 
platforms fill this need for donors by allowing donors to not only publicize their donation, but 
also share with their social networks the campaigns they donated to. 
 
75 Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008 
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Yang 41 
 
Moreover, by publicizing their claim to their donation, crowdfunding platforms also 
encourage higher donation amounts. Economist Sarah Smith organizes online crowdfunding 
donations into three categories: shining knights, widows’ mites, and the herd. Shining knights are 
large donations that signal wealth, generosity, or the intimacy of the relationship between the 
donor and beneficiary. Widows’ mites are small donations made primarily to avoid social stigma 
for not participating. The herd are the modal donations who give what others give. What is 
observed for the average donor is that they donate based on what they think they are expected to 
give. That subjective evaluation considers what their peers have publicly donated. The publicly 
avaliable data of past donations thus anchors how the average herd donor evaluates how much 
they should donate. 
Thus, crowdfunding platforms attract donors because they raise awareness, facilitate 
solicitations on social media channels, lower donation costs, and publicize donations to enhance 
donor reputations. From the variety of causes captured donors can donate to, people donate to 
healthcare, because of these four intrinsic factors: value-alignment, efficacy; altruism; and warm-
glow effects. 
ii. People donate to health care campaigns, because of value-alignment, efficacy, altruism, 
and warm-glow effects. 
 
First, people donate because of value alignment. People who value the common good, 
social justice, and the health of the overall society are more likely to donate to causes that lead to 
their better world. Bekkers and Wiepking find that donors’ value systems inform donors of what 
their ideal world looks like. Motivated to make the world better, donors then donate to causes 
that bring them closer to their ideal world.79 Therefore, people who want a world where there is 
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universal access to health care are more likely to donate to individuals asking for donations to 
fund their health care needs. 
In healthcare, this value alignment happens quite frequently, because humans are 
psychologically predisposed to value health care. Despite the politics on how to reform health 
care, health care is a valence issue that cuts across partisan lines. Human evolution historians 
Carsten Jensen and Michael Bang Petersen attribute its valence to people’s instinct to care about 
health care. Humans are naturally been predisposed to concerning themselves with the random 
nature of sickness and the need for help when they are sick. These two factors are essential to 
survival but are often out of human control. As a result, these two factors have evolved into 
deep-seated psychological constraints that naturally bias people to perceive the sick as deserving 
of support.80 Thus, people will be motivated to give because of this psychologically ingrained 
valuation for people’s health.    
Second, people give for efficacy. These donors want their donation to maximize its 
impact. Bekkers and Wiepking observe that donations and perceived efficacy of that donation are 
directly related.81 Extending similar findings, economist Brian Duncan proposes a theory for 
charitable giving to capture this desire to donate to make a perceived difference: impact 
philanthropy. Impact philanthropy suggests that people donate to causes in which they can 
personally make a difference.82  
Thus, donors donate to health care crowdfunding, because providing for one’s health care 
comes with other benefits. Aside from the positive media stories of individuals securing health 
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care through crowdfunding, donors can also reference the positive externalities that they help 
generate by crowdfunding an individual’s health care. Between 2006 and 2011, crowdfunding 
scholars Gordon Burtch and Jason Chan find that health care campaigns reduced about 3.9 
percent of all medical related bankruptcies in the United States.83 Thus, donors who donate to 
health care crowdfunding can help reduce the individual’s bankruptcy risk, which can allow the 
patient to not have to sell their house to pay off their health care expenses. If the patient recovers, 
then the donation will help extend the patient’s lifetime with the patient’s friends and family. 
Third, on a similar vein, people donate because of altruism. The difference among value-
aligned, efficacy, and altruistic donors is their goals. Value-aligned donors care about advancing 
their greater society. Efficacy-motivated donors care about maximizing their individual impact. 
Meanwhile, altruistic donors care about just helping the beneficiary to whatever capacity the 
donor can. The donor’s welfare is therefore a function of how much of the basic good is provided 
rather than by how it is funded. A large body of literature captures this motivation through the 
public goods theory of philanthropy. A key premise to this theory is that the cause that people 
crowdfund is considered a public good, because this cause is a factor in most of the public’s 
individual utility functions. If it wasn’t, then people wouldn’t donate. Often, this utility comes 
from the cause’s altruistic externalities, of which better health care has many of.84 For example, a 
donor donating to another person’s health care treatment derives utility from knowing that they 
have helped improve that person’s welfare. Thus, altruism can motivate giving behavior to health 
care campaigns. 
 
83 Burtch and Chan, 2018 
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However, altruistic giving to health care can lead to crowding out of public provision for 
health care. A major concern within the altruistic giving literature is that there is a dollar-for-
dollar indirect relationship between private and public provision for basic goods. The increase in 
one will crowd out funds provided by the other. Economist Robert Sugden observes that this 
crowding out effect exists but does not persist.85 Health care crowdfunding literature also 
observes the crowding out effect but is inconclusive on its persistence. Political sociologist 
Martin Lukk finds that Canadian health care crowdfunding is growing as government health 
expenditure is decreasing.86 Across countries, Dr. Gaia Bassani finds data suggesting a 
substitution effect between health care crowdfunding and public health insurance.87 While these 
early studies suggest a potential crowding out effect, the research is limited and inconclusive on 
how persistent this effect is. 
As an alternative explanation for the lack of a persistent crowding out effect from pure 
altruism, the fourth reason people donate is to enjoy the warm glow effect. Thus, people give not 
necessarily because of the altruistic interests in helping others but rather because of the warm 
glow the donor feels by doing good. This warm glow is captured by the impure altruism theory. 
The theory provides an alternative explanation to the crowding out concern by pure altruist 
scholars. Andreoni builds the impure altruism theory to predict that in a world where there are 
only two payers for basic needs – government and private individual donors – government funds 
will incompletely crowd out private donations. Because individual donors feel a warm glow from 
donating, they do not see their donations as perfect substitutes for government contributions.88 
As such, they will still donate regardless of the extent of public provision, because the donation 
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makes them feel good. Economists Heidi Crumpler and Philip J. Grossman find that this warm 
glow exists and plays a significant role in explaining giving behavior.89 Economist William 
Harbaugh supports their findings with his neuropsychological analysis, which shows that 
donating elicits neural activity in areas associated with reward processing.90  
However, because people donate for the warm glow effect, they may be less likely to 
optimize the welfare impact of their donations. Global Health researcher Clair Null observes that 
most donors exhibit socially inefficient giving behavior. That is, they continue to give to 
campaigns they like, even when those campaigns have exceeded their goals and other 
comparable campaigns are underfunded. She explains part of this inefficient behavior by finding 
that few donors care about information gathering, which would have allowed them to evaluate 
and maximize the welfare impact of their donations.91 Thus, these findings are consistent with 
the charitable giving literature that suggests that warm-glow givers are less likely to care about 
the welfare implications of their donations. As a result, some campaigns may be overfunded, and 
others may be underfunded. 
Thus, people donate to health care crowdfunding campaigns. People donate to health care 
campaigns because of values-alignment, efficacy in maximizing individual impact, altruism, and 
warm-glow effects. Donors give through crowdfunding platforms, because the platforms raise 
awareness, facilitate solicitations on social media channels, lower donation costs, and publicize 
donations to enhance donor reputations. These findings provide insight on what types of 
campaigns are likely to get funded. 
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The four intrinsic factors motivate giving to the underserved segments of the health 
insurance market. These segments have the greatest demand and are prevalent in society. There 
are two segments: the uninsured for being low-income in non-Medicaid expansion states and 
those without adequate insurance for having chronic conditions. Value-aligned donors will 
donate to correct a society inadequacy. Efficacy-donors will donate, because donating to causes 
with the greatest demands can maximize the donor’s impact. Altruists will donate to these 
segments, because they need help. Impure altruists will donate to get warm glow from doing 
good. Thus, these two segments appropriately fit the four intrinsic factors. 
However, income changes the dynamic of where crowdfunding dollars are likely to go. 
People donate on crowdfunding platforms, because of awareness, solicitation, cost, and 
reputation. A caveat to this literature though is that not everyone has the resources to donate, 
even if the desire to exists. Generally, those who donate have disposable income, and are 
typically not low-income. Moreover, donors are subjective rather than objective in evaluating 
need. Consequently, they will likely fall victim to similar-to-me bias, thereby concentrating 
crowdfunding dollars on middle- to high-income beneficiaries. Early health care crowdfunding 
literature highlights how donors gravitated toward high-income, homeowners, and highly 
educated urban residents.92 Thus, while chronic disease campaigns, which are less discriminatory 
based on income, should still see more crowdfunded dollars, campaigns to cover health needs for 
low-income people should see less crowdfunded dollars. 
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VII. Two hypotheses seek to match crowdfunding supply with demand. 
 
In this section, I will synthesize the two hypotheses ultimately argue that healthcare 
crowdfunding will help provide for only one of the two groups I identified as being most likely 
to demand need. The limiting factor on the welfare-enhancing impacts of health care 
crowdfunding is that donors make subjective assessments of need, and thus are likely to donate 
to people who are like them.  
The greatest demand for health care crowdfunding is concentrated among two segments 
left inadequately insured by the private health insurance market. Because of market frictions in 
contingent contracts, adverse selection, and moral hazard, the greatest demand for health care 
crowdfunding belongs to low-income individuals in non-Medicaid expansion states and chronic 
care patients.  
Because individuals in non-Medicaid expansion states lack other alternatives for health 
coverage, I assume that individuals who crowdfund for health care needs in non-Medicaid 
expansion states are low-income. While this may be a broad generalization, this assumption is 
reasonable, because non-Medicaid expansion states have higher uninsured rates and generally 
have smaller state budgets.93 Moreover, many of the campaigns in non-Medicaid expansion 
states in my dataset attribute the lack of insurance and income to explain why they need funding. 
I will proceed then by equating campaigns in non-Medicaid expansion states as campaigns that 
demand the most need among the low-income. 
The supply for health care crowdfunding is subjective and biased by income differences. 
Donors are motivated to give to either group’s demands based on value-alignment, efficacy, 
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altruism, or warm glow effect. However, donors generally are not low-income. They generally 
have disposable income. Moreover, donations are made based on subjective evaluations of need, 
which are vulnerable to similar-to-me biases.  
This creates two implications for the supply and demand dynamics for this market. 
Because of the prevalence of chronic diseases, donors should still be more likely to give to 
chronic diseases relative to their medical alternative – acute diseases, or short-term diseases – 
regardless of income. However, because donors are less likely to be low-income, donors are less 
likely to donate to low-income beneficiaries, denoted by their residency in non-Medicaid 
expansion states, than those in Medicaid-expansion states. 
Thus, I present two hypotheses: 
1. Non-Medicaid expansion state health care crowdfunding campaigns will receive less 
crowdfunding than Medicaid-expansion state campaigns. 
2. Campaigns crowdfunding for chronic diseases will receive more crowdfunding than 
campaigns crowdfunding for acute diseases. 
VIII. Methodology 
 
I use GoFundMe to build my health care crowdfunding dataset. Recent literature on 
health care crowdfunding has a list of 42 donation-based health care crowdfunding platforms.94 I 
narrow that list to platforms that are American-based companies, which result in 18 platforms. 
Among them, I find only three platforms that focus primarily on individual health care 
crowdfunding platforms: GoFundMe, GiveForward, and YouCaring. The other 15 platforms are 
niche players that crowdfund for specific diseases or medical research. I choose GoFundMe as 
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my source, because it is the largest and only remaining active platform. GoFundMe owns 
YouCaring, which acquired GiveForward. As a result, YouCaring and GiveForward are both 
deactivated. 
On GoFundMe, I collect campaigns through the curated “Discover Medical Fundraisers” 
(referenced as “Discover” moving forward) page and through keyword search results. The results 
in “Discover” are ordered by their amount raised, limited in selection, and are thus not 
representative of the population. The minimum amount raised among these campaigns is 
$27,325. Given that all empirical studies in health care crowdfunding literature have campaigns 
that raised nothing, this minimum indicates that the data is positively skewed. A concern from 
this ordering process is that it could potentially perpetuate a momentum effect: Trending 
campaigns continue to raise more money, while campaigns that lack traction continue to 
underperform. Given the limited representativeness of “Discover,” I expand my data collection 
through keyword searches on: Medical, Healthcare, Chronic, and Acute. “Chronic” and “Acute” 
refer to chronic and acute diseases. These terms are chosen, because they are most relevant to the 
scope of this research. 
I collect 5,596 eligible campaigns after filtering for eligibility and duplicates. For 
comparison, a previous study found 2,204 health care campaigns.95 I filter campaigns for 
eligibility by checking that the parsed campaigns are crowdfunding for individual health care 
needs of US-based residents. For example, some parsed campaigns were fundraising in euros, 
with beneficiaries located in Australia, or crowdfunding for money to publish a book with 
“Acute” in its title. These campaigns would be omitted from the dataset. Then, because some 
campaigns appear in multiple search results, I omit the duplicate campaign. I leave the campaign 
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that uses a more specific search term, such as “Chronic” or “Acute.” If the duplicates are found 
within generic searches like “Healthcare,” “Medical,” or “Discover,” then I leave the first 
campaign that shows up in the data organization process. 
To evaluate the representativeness of the campaigns collected, I run a statistical analysis 
in Table 1 to evaluate the spread of campaigns. I use Microsoft Excel to analyze the data. Three 
of the four keyword searches have a at least one campaign that has a minimum amount raised of 
$0.  “Medical” has a minimum of $354. These numbers are lower than the minimum for 
“Discover.” Additionally, the average raised for “Discover” is $50,485.19, which is more than 
double its next highest average at $23,582.81 by “Medical.” 
Table 1. Population summary statistics on the amount of money raised (n=5,596 campaigns) 
Search: Discover Healthcare Medical Chronic Acute 
N 871 779 865 1523 1558 
MIN  $   27,325.00   $          0.00     $        354.00    $          0.00        $               0.00 
Q1  $   31,032.00   $      140.00   $     2,800.00   $        110.00   $        2,456.25  
Q2  $   37,840.00   $   1,250.00   $     7,750.00   $     2,865.00   $        7,245.00  
Q3  $   52,284.00   $   2,990.00   $   24,980.00   $   12,890.00   $      17,258.25  
MAX  $ 884,686.00   $ 97,235.00   $ 433,512.00   $ 415,274.00   $ 1,800,000.00  
AVG  $   50,485.19   $   3,113.07   $   23,582.81   $   12,372.71   $      17,273.79  
STDEV  $   51,589.72   $   7,184.20   $   43,266.39   $   27,852.94   $      65,280.37  
 
I proceed to map the quartile-metrics onto a box-and-whiskers plot in Figure 1 to show that the 
performance of the campaigns is heavily right-skewed across all five groups. There is a long 
right tail with a highly concentrated portion of the campaigns falling around $100,000 across all 
search terms. Thus, most campaigns raise very little, and outliers plague each group. This 
observation is consistent with existing healthcare crowdfunding studies that conclude that only 
some campaigns outperform, while most raise very little. 
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Looking individually at the distribution of each campaign’s performance within their 
search term categories in Figure 2, I see that the distributions are random across different search 
terms. Campaign ID has no relevance to the analysis at hand but rather refers to each campaign’s 
row number in their respective Microsoft Excel tabs. My dependent variable is the amount raised 
in dollars. For “Discover,” I observe a long right-hand tail to the data, which reinforces the 
limitations to the “Discover” sample. For “Healthcare,” I observe a random distribution that has 
two peaks that each raise about $100,000. I expect the distribution of “Medical” to be similar to 
that of “Healthcare,” because of the similarities in their definitions. Instead, I observe much more 
variation among the amounts raised for “Medical.” Thus, while the campaigns collected are all 
health care crowdfunding campaigns, the two keywords produce very different distributions. 
“Chronic” and “Acute” also have different distributions. “Chronic” ends with a long right-hand 
tail, while “Acute” begins with a long left-hand tail in the distribution. Nonetheless, the varying 
row heights that suggest different amounts raised do seem to show a randomness to the 
collection of this subset.  
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Figure 2. Campaign amount raised are randomly distributed across keywords 
  
 
 
Since the data is user self-reported, I assume that the data is accurate and representative 
of the individual’s actual state. Campaigns are accurately marking the beneficiary’s health 
condition as either “Acute” or “Chronic.” The campaigns reflect the location of where the 
beneficiary is at. For example, a campaign identified to be in Pennsylvania will benefit a 
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Pennsylvanian beneficiary. Thus, I assume that all the campaigns are making legitimate requests 
that are reflective of what the beneficiary needs. While there are media stories covering 
fraudulent healthcare crowdfunding campaigns, this is difficult to verify without the back-end 
data from GoFundMe. Thus, I rely on GoFundMe’s enforcement of policies that punish 
fraudulent activity on its platform to assume that the campaigns I get are accurate and legitimate. 
Then, I use ParseHub, a web-based data scraping tool, to gather data on each campaign’s 
location, amount raised, target amount, and number of donors, shares, followers, and donations. I 
refer to the 2020 Kaiser Family Foundation data to identify non-Medicaid expansion states from 
Medicaid expansion states.96 Consistent with most healthcare crowdfunding literature, I use the 
amount raised as my primary dependent variable to track financial performance. I use the target 
amount as a reference point for demand. Then, I use the number of donors, shares, followers, and 
donations as dependent variables that can help suggest explanations for discrepancies in 
performance. 
I test for hypothesis 1 by acknowledging an implicit assumption and adding a new 
dependent variable. I assume that people in non-Medicaid expansion states who are 
crowdfunding for health care needs are low-income. Because state populations vary, I also 
introduce a dollar per capita measurement to account for population differences.  
I test for hypothesis 2 by sorting the campaigns by their respective keyword search 
results. Thus, results found in the keyword search “Acute” are considered campaigns 
crowdfunding for acute diseases.  
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IX: Results 
 
 In this section, I analyze the results of the data. I find supporting evidence that campaigns 
in non-Medicaid expansion states raise less money than Medicaid-expansion states, because 
people donate in higher amounts in expansion-states. Meanwhile, I find no supporting evidence 
that campaigns crowdfunding for chronic diseases will raise more money. Instead, I find that 
donors are more likely to donate to campaigns treating for acute diseases.  
i. Hypothesis 1: Non-Medicaid expansion state health care crowdfunding campaigns will 
receive less crowdfunding than Medicaid-expansion state campaigns. 
 
I segment 5,596 campaigns using location as a dummy variable to determine whether the 
campaign is in a Medicaid-expansion state or a non-expansion state. Including Washington DC, 
the data represents 35 expansion-states out of 36 in total. All 15 non-expansion states are 
represented in this data.  
On an aggregate absolute basis, the data in Figure 3 show that expansion-states raise 
more than non-expansion states. The total raised by expansion states is $87,223,723. The total 
raised by non-expansion states is $24,924,775. Thus, campaigns in expansion states are getting 
more in aggregate. 
Even when accounting for completion rates within groups relative to the aggregate 
amount they demand, expansion-states demand and get more crowdfunding dollars. To account 
for the differences in demand across groups, I divide the sum of raised by the sum of goal. 
Expansion-states demanded $683,828,430 and had an average completion rate of 64.67%. Non-
expansion states demanded $170,315,314 and had an average completion rate of 0.06%.  
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 Despite showing differences in financial performance and number of campaigns, both 
groups are relatively similar when considering the data in Table 2. The sample size difference 
amounts to 2,106. Thus, the dataset may exhibit a skewness resulting from the unequal 
proportion of campaigns. However, even with such a volume difference in campaigns and the 
amount raised, the difference between the number of donors, followers, and donations are all 
relatively small. The biggest discrepancy is in the aggregate number of shares within each group. 
The difference amounts to 6,317,197. This is significant, as shares help beneficiaries raise 
awareness and solicit for donations, which are important to driving donor behavior. However, the 
impact of this difference is unclear, because the number of donors and donations made is 
relatively similar with only a difference of 1,381. 
The small difference in donor count and donations made suggests that people in non-
expansion states are likely donating less dollars per donation than people in expansion-states. 
Theoretically, if people donate the same amount per donation, then the differences in the number 
of donors and donations between expansion and non-expansion states should reflect differences 
in amount raised. However, the data shows small differences in the numbers of donors and 
donations. Moreover, the differences in social media performance seem relatively small. Even 
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Figure 3. Expansion states raise more than non-
expansion states (n=5,596)
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with the difference in shares, the number of shares seems to have a small effect on attracting 
donors and donations. Meanwhile, the financial discrepancies are significant. Hence, this finding 
suggests that the people in non-expansion states are just donating more money than those in 
expansion-states. 
 
Table 2. Expansion and non-expansion states are relatively similar in aggregate 
Medicaid Expansion? Expansion Non-expansion ∆Exp-Non-exp 
N                               3,851                    1,745  2,106  
#donors 1254155 1252774 1,381  
#shares 6318297 1100               6,317,197  
#followers 1303490 1302062 1,428  
#donations 1439052 1437493 1,559  
 However, states vary in population and thus, population differences may impact 
performance. That is, small states hypothetically could have less people to donate to on an 
absolute basis. And thus, there is less competition and spreading of limited financial resources. 
Consequently, the small state may be donating more on a per capita basis. 
I control for state population differences on campaign financial performance by creating 
per capita metrics. I begin by aggregating how much is raised and demanded on a state-by-state 
basis. I also use 2019 projections on state populations from the Census Bureau.97 I then divide 
each respective financial sum with its corresponding state population to get a dollar amount per 
capita metric. Finally, I use the “SUMPRODUCT” function in Microsoft Excel to calculate 
average per capita metrics within each grouping by multiplying each state’s per capita metric 
with the state population as a percentage of total group population. 
Within Medicaid-expansion states, there is variability in performance as shown in Table 
3.1. The average amount raised per capita is $0.40 while the average amount demanded per 
 
97 The United States Census Bureau, 2019 
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capita is $3.21. Massachusetts and New York have the most dollars raised per capita, at $0.79 
and $0.74 respectively. Arkansas raise the least per capita at $0.06 and demand relatively little at 
$0.34. This suggests that crowdfunding is not as prevalent in Arkansas as it is in other states. 
New Mexico has the greatest discrepancy between amount raised and demanded. New Mexico 
campaigns demand $238.79 per capita but only raise $0.11 per capita. Thus, while New Mexico 
seems to have the greatest need, this need is not adequately met.  
Within non-expansion states, Table 3.2 shows less inconsistencies in performance across 
states. The dollar amount raised per capita is $0.21, while the dollar amount demanded per capita 
is $1.50. Wyoming and Florida raise the most per capita, with $0.44 and $0.36 respectively. 
South Carolina and Alabama raise the least per capita at $0.11 and $0.12 respectively; they also 
demand the least. Thus, this suggests that crowdfunding for health care may not be as prevalent 
within these two states. Wisconsin has the greatest difference between how much they need and 
how much they get. Wisconsin demand $17.47 per capita but receive $0.16 per capita. 
Thus on a per capita basis, expansion-states still raise more money than non-expansion 
states. Figure 4 shows that the amount raised per capita for expansion and non-expansion states 
is $0.40 and $0.21, respectively. This difference suggests that expansion states are spending 
almost double of what non-expansion states spend per capita on crowdfunding to health care.  
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Table 3.1. Financial performance per capita for Medicaid-expansion states 
Medicaid 
Expansion? 
Population  
(2019) Sum of raised 
$raised per 
capita* Sum of goal 
$demanded per 
capita* 
Expansion 213,230,991 $        84,841,431  $                   0.40  $         683,642,549  $                      3.21  
 AK 731,545 $             317,371  $                   0.43  $                803,000  $                      1.10  
 AR 3,017,804 $             183,644  $                   0.06  $             1,030,195  $                      0.34  
 AZ 7,278,717 $          1,993,756  $                   0.27  $             4,550,747  $                      0.63  
 CA 39,512,223 $        18,878,893  $                   0.48  $           36,623,750  $                      0.93  
 CO 5,758,736 $          3,059,774  $                   0.53  $             6,144,992  $                      1.07  
 CT 3,565,287 $          1,808,564  $                   0.51  $             3,411,232  $                      0.96  
 DC 705,749 $             295,240  $                   0.42  $             1,575,500  $                      2.23  
 DE 973,764 $             408,424  $                   0.42  $             1,408,300  $                      1.45  
 HI 1,415,872 $             924,222  $                   0.65  $             2,742,000  $                      1.94  
 IA 3,155,070 $             508,850  $                   0.16  $                804,700  $                      0.26  
 ID 1,787,065 $             512,029  $                   0.29  $                912,100  $                      0.51  
 IL 12,671,821 $          3,969,808  $                   0.31  $             7,424,716  $                      0.59  
 IN 6,732,219 $             997,375  $                   0.15  $             2,192,018  $                      0.33  
 KY 4,467,673 $             582,432  $                   0.13  $             1,905,900  $                      0.43  
 LA 4,648,794 $             477,870  $                   0.10  $             1,039,700  $                      0.22  
 MA 6,892,503 $          5,410,736  $                   0.79  $             6,857,160  $                      0.99  
 MD 6,045,680 $          1,449,815  $                   0.24  $             3,987,800  $                      0.66  
 MI 9,986,857 $          2,519,601  $                   0.25  $             5,649,027  $                      0.57  
 MN 5,639,632 $          1,744,357  $                   0.31  $             2,787,601  $                      0.49  
 MT 1,068,778 $             312,613  $                   0.29  $                539,500  $                      0.50  
 ND 762,062 $             346,377  $                   0.45  $                435,364  $                      0.57  
 NH 1,359,711 $             469,258  $                   0.35  $                935,900  $                      0.69  
 NJ 8,882,190 $          4,887,278  $                   0.55  $           10,151,147  $                      1.14  
 NM 2,096,829 $             223,043  $                   0.11  $         500,704,000  $                  238.79  
 NV 3,080,156 $             910,540  $                   0.30  $             2,369,620  $                      0.77  
 NY 19,453,561 $        14,409,341  $                   0.74  $           38,919,216  $                      2.00  
 OH 11,689,100 $          2,132,938  $                   0.18  $             4,194,910  $                      0.36  
 OR 4,217,737 $          1,562,112  $                   0.37  $             3,223,990  $                      0.76  
 PA 12,801,989 $          4,374,655  $                   0.34  $             6,517,447  $                      0.51  
 RI 1,059,361 $             446,121  $                   0.42  $                590,948  $                      0.56  
 UT 3,205,958 $          1,774,457  $                   0.55  $             3,802,550  $                      1.19  
 VA 8,535,519 $          3,009,156  $                   0.35  $             9,920,569  $                      1.16  
 VT 623,989 $             407,630  $                   0.65  $                461,200  $                      0.74  
 WA 7,614,893 $          3,332,777  $                   0.44  $             6,610,398  $                      0.87  
 WV 1,792,147 $             200,374  $                   0.11  $             2,415,352  $                      1.35  
*The greener the cell, the higher the dollar per capita amount. The redder the cell, the lower the dollar per capita amount.  
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Table 3.2. Financial performance per capita for non-expansion states 
Medicaid 
Expansion? 
Population  
(2019) Sum of raised 
$raised per 
capita* Sum of goal 
$demanded per 
capita 
Non-
expansion 113,664,320  $        24,364,689   $                   0.21   $         170,833,285   $                      1.50  
 AL 4,903,185 $             605,775  $                   0.12  $             1,179,690  $                      0.24  
 FL 21,477,737 $          7,642,798  $                   0.36  $           22,806,075  $                      1.06  
 GA 10,617,423 $          1,531,852  $                   0.14  $           13,341,410  $                      1.26  
 KS 2,913,314 $             549,692  $                   0.19  $             1,415,500  $                      0.49  
 MO 6,137,428 $             835,777  $                   0.14  $             1,643,244  $                      0.27  
 MS 2,976,149 $             452,497  $                   0.15  $             1,143,370  $                      0.38  
 NC 10,488,084 $          1,842,530  $                   0.18  $             4,857,960  $                      0.46  
 NE 1,934,408 $             404,557  $                   0.21  $                610,400  $                      0.32  
 OK 3,956,971 $             842,771  $                   0.21  $             2,126,250  $                      0.54  
 SC 5,148,714 $             573,872  $                   0.11  $             1,135,321  $                      0.22  
 SD 884,659 $             127,595  $                   0.14  $                313,700  $                      0.35  
 TN 6,829,174 $          1,487,543  $                   0.22  $             2,763,700  $                      0.40  
 TX 28,995,881 $          6,296,510  $                   0.22  $           15,243,198  $                      0.53  
 WI 5,822,434 $             916,109  $                   0.16  $         101,721,467  $                    17.47  
 WY 578,759 $             254,811  $                   0.44  $                532,000  $                      0.92  
   
 
ii. Hypothesis 2: Campaigns crowdfunding for chronic diseases will receive more 
crowdfunding than campaigns crowdfunding for acute diseases. 
 
I segment 3,081 campaigns using “Acute” and “Chronic” as the explanatory variables. 
Then, I evaluate for the aggregate amounts the two groups raise on an absolute basis. If the 
hypothesis finds supporting data, then campaigns on chronic diseases should be raising more 
money than those on acute diseases. 
On an aggregate absolute basis, the data in Figure 5 show that campaigns for acute 
diseases raise more than those for chronic diseases. The total raised by acute diseases campaigns 
is $31,616,031. The total raised by chronic disease campaigns is $23,314,407. Thus, on an 
absolute aggregate basis, campaigns on acute diseases are raising more money. 
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Accounting for factors such as number of campaigns, shares, followers, and donations, 
the data in Table 4 suggests that supply of donors is the greatest differentiator in performance. I 
observe that the number of campaigns is roughly equal. The deltas across shares and followers 
are relatively small. Acute gets 46,720 more donations, but that can be explained primarily due 
to the stark advantage it has in attracting donors. The delta in donor count is 302,253; acute 
campaigns are attracting almost double the number of donors that chronic campaigns are 
attracting. Thus, there leads me to believe that crowdfunding performance for chronic and acute 
conditions are less reliant on marketing effort or the condition itself, but rather on the availability 
of donors in your network. 
Table 4. Performance of acute and chronic disease 
campaigns 
Category Acute Chronic ∆Acute-Chronic 
n 1,523 1,558 -35 
#donors 653,161 350,908 302,253 
#shares 1,827,892 1,802,004 25,888 
#followers 313,556 366,949 -53,393 
#donations 350,444 397,164 -46,720 
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Figure 5. Acute diseases raised more than 
chronic diseases (n=3,081)
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X: Discussion  
 
 In this section, I will synthesize my empirical findings, then propose an alternative 
explanation that explains the results I gathered. I proceed to discussing the three key limitations 
to the research an propose what an ideal research would look like. I end with a reflection on 
personal takeaways from this research.  
To synthesize, the data supports the first hypothesis and rejects the second hypothesis. As 
a result, both indicate that health care crowdfunding is not necessarily serving groups with the 
greatest need for alternative health care financing.  
The first hypothesis is supported by the data. The first hypothesis predicts that campaigns 
in non-expansion states will raise less money than that expansion states. The data show that on a 
per capita basis, Medicaid-expansion states raise $0.40, and non-expansion states raise $0.21. 
Thus, this hypothesis does find supporting evidence within the data.  
This finding is consistent with existing health care crowdfunding research that suggests 
that health care crowdfunding perpetuates socioeconomic divisions, because of their reliance on 
social media networks. Crowdfunding relies on social media networks. This reliance on social 
networks perpetuates the socioeconomic divides already existent in social networks. The 
socioeconomic divisions pervade online health care crowdfunding, because low-income people 
will likely have networks that are also low-income.98 The opposite is also true. Studies have 
found that health care crowdfunding usage is positively correlated with high income, home 
ownership, and high educational attainment.99 As a result, it seems like the rich will continue to 
give to the rich, while the poor will again be left out by this market. The socioeconomically 
 
98 Snyder, 2016 
99 Duynhoven, et al., 2019 
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disadvantaged are more likely to be excluded from reaping the benefits of the growing health 
care crowdfunding market.100 Thus, rather than increasing access to health care, health care 
crowdfunding seems to perpetuate existing socioeconomic divisions. 
The second hypothesis is not supported by the data. The second hypothesis predicts that 
campaigns covering chronic diseases will raise more money than that of acute diseases. The data 
do not support this hypothesis. Despite no significant differences in social media performance 
and in the volume of campaigns, acute conditions are significantly more successful than chronic 
campaigns. The finding is explained by the difference in the number of donors, with 653,151 
donors going to acute campaigns, and 350,908 donors going to acute campaigns. The difference 
equals 302,253, thus showing that acute campaigns are attracting almost double the number of 
donors that chronic campaigns are attracting.  
An implication for this finding is that based on the data, people are not necessarily 
crowdfunding health care expenses for significant long-term health conditions. Instead, health 
care crowdfunding is reserved for more acute, one-off, unexpected health conditions. This 
suggests that health care crowdfunding is not primarily used as a long-term solution. 
A potential theory to explain the findings for the second hypothesis could be the role of 
efficacy-driven donors. Donors are subjective, and thus determine their own standards for 
efficacy. If the standards are likelihood of success in treatment, then chronic conditions are less 
attractive. Chronic conditions take a long time to treat. Diseases like diabetes are manageable but 
inevitably untreatable. Thus, efficacy-driven donors that care about maximizing the impact of 
 
100 Lukk et al., 2018 
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their donation will likely donate to acute campaigns. The findings would then suggest that 
efficacy plays a significant role in health care crowdfunding. 
This alternative theory does not violate the first hypothesis. An impact-maximizing 
efficacy-driven donor may donate to campaigns by higher income beneficiaries, because 
donating to them may have a greater impact. At the very least, their campaigns are more likely to 
succeed. Health care crowdfunding literature suggests that higher income people run more 
successful campaigns. Thus, efficacy-driven donors may feel like their contribution will be better 
served giving a small amount to a campaign that is likely to succeed as opposed to giving a large 
amount but still falling short.  
However, the implications for this explanation have serious welfare concerns about the 
inefficient allocation of private donations. Charitable giving literature talks about how donations 
are made subjectively and based on perception. Thus, the impact-maximization utility function 
that efficacy-driven donors, who are likely not low-income, are likely to be colored by their 
socioeconomic background. And because these donations are subjective, there studies in 
charitable giving literature show that people donate inefficiently.101 Health care crowdfunding 
market studies echo a similar concern. Donors left to their own devices act as a negative 
externality in potentially inhibiting broader public health goals.102 Thus, at face value, a lot of 
money is going into health care crowdfunding. However, these efforts are just letting those with 
better resources to donate to people in similar socioeconomic classes. And they keep donating to 
those people, because they are not necessarily interested in broader public health goals. But, 
because of this absolute inflow of capital into health care crowdfunding, health care 
 
101 Null, 2011 
102 Renwick and Mossialos, 2017 
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crowdfunding may ostensibly be the prevailing solution to get funding for health care expenses. 
In turn, this perception may adversely impact efforts to achieve broader public health goals that 
aim to offer a long-term and structural solution.   
Aside from these implications, I acknowledge that there are three key limitations to this 
thesis: sample representativeness, confounding variables, and lack of qualitative analysis. 
First, despite creating a relatively large and randomly distributed sample, I am limited in 
the representativeness of the sample. I was limited in the amount of campaigns I could scrape 
from each GoFundMe search, because of GoFundMe’s algorithms. Moreover, I was not able to 
capture how timing impacts campaign performance. Aside from the campaigns constantly 
updating in near real-time when a donation is made, timing can impact the context and subjective 
priorities that people are likely to donate to. I tried to minimize time differences by conducting 
the searches concurrently in one sitting, but I was not able to find campaigns created in 2010, 
before the ACA passed. Perhaps those campaigns could show how the supply and demand 
changed over time. Thus, the campaigns I did collect represents the state of searchable 
campaigns in January 28, 2020. 
Second, because I lack backend user data from GoFundMe, I cannot control for some 
confounding variables. For example, while I use location to segment expansion and non- 
expansion states, then use that as a proxy for income of the beneficiaries, I acknowledge that 
there are limitations to this assumption. Moreover, while I was not able to control for income in a 
similar manner as in hypothesis 1 with hypothesis 2, where income may play a role in accessing 
treatment for chronically ill patients. I was unable to account for income in evaluating the second 
hypothesis, because I did not account for location data when I conducted my initial analysis for 
hypothesis 2. If I had more time, I would have conducted this analysis to see how the state of 
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Medicaid-expansion impacts chronic and acute campaign performance through a PivotTable. 
Moreover, if I had user data from GoFundMe, then perhaps I could have controlled for zip code, 
gender, race, and other potentially confounding variables to increase my control on these 
variables’ impact on socioeconomic status and campaign performance. 
Third, due to feasibility constraints, I was not able to conduct a qualitative analysis on the 
narratives. In future studies, I would do a qualitative analysis on a sample of the campaigns to 
understand the difference in quality of the campaigns. My research currently assumes that the 
quality of all the campaigns are the same, on average, within their groupings. However, it is 
likely that higher-income people are better at marketing their cause, and thus more successful in 
crowdfunding. This would be an interesting hypothesis to test with a qualitative analysis for 
future studies. 
Acknowledging these limitations, an ideal research design for this thesis would have 
included the following parts. First, using back-end user meta-data, I would have been able to use 
a PivotTable on Microsoft Excel to identify donors and beneficiary’s based on zip code and other 
indicators that suggest their income level. Then, I would scrape all possible health care 
crowdfunding campaigns on GoFundMe from 2009 to 2019. I want to consider the impact of the 
ACA on chronic conditions and low-income individuals. Moreover, I want to see how the health 
care crowdfunding market evolved across time, because support for my two hypotheses could 
have varied depending on context. Perhaps, before the ACA was implemented, chronic 
conditions were more likely to get crowdfunding. Next, I would conduct a similar quantitative 
analysis evaluating the two hypotheses. However, I would also add in a qualitative component, 
by running a small experiment in which donors are asked to evaluate their desirability to donate 
to a variety of health care crowdfunding campaigns. An interview would follow the experiment 
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to gather behavioral insights on subjective perception of need. I will combine the findings from 
the qualitative with that of the quantitative to draw conclusions on this research. Such an ideal 
experimental would require extensive time, coordination with GoFundMe to potentially violate 
user privacy laws, and funding. Thus, this would have been infeasible given my current 
circumstances. 
Nonetheless, these findings have made me question my belief in the private provision for 
basic goods. As someone entering the private sector, I believe in the impact individuals can make 
by giving to help others left behind by the broken healthcare system. I am attracted to the 
operational efficiency of the private sector and believe that private sector innovation can be used 
to do good. Thus, I started this research thinking that crowdfunding platforms could more allow 
individuals who want to do good to provide for basic structural health care gaps in our society. I 
thought that health care crowdfunding could help those most underserved by the private and 
public markets. While I do find that some people are contributing to help those in great need, my 
empirical analysis also suggests that these donors make up the minority. Thus, I think my 
understanding of how individuals can make impact through the private sector has become more 
nuanced. While the platforms and products themselves have the potential to do good, 
coordination is still required to bring that potential to fruition. 
XI: Conclusion 
 
 As more Americans turn to health care crowdfunding as a means of financing their 
burdensome health care costs, this thesis finds that crowdfunding is not a sustainable solution.  
Crowdfunding dollars are less likely to go to low-income individuals in non-Medicaid expansion 
states, because socioeconomic divisions in real-life and ingrained into online social networks, 
which crowdfunding platforms rely on. Moreover, crowdfunding dollars are less likely to go to 
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chronic disease campaigns, thus suggesting that health care crowdfunding is more functional in 
raising money for short-term medical conditions. 
 This thesis provides one main contribution to the charitable giving literatures. This thesis 
contributes to charitable giving literature, by being the first paper to draw upon the theoretical 
foundation of charitable giving to explain the health care crowdfunding phenomenon. This thesis 
contextualizes a modern and novel medium of charitable giving within a more extensive and 
historical body of literature that studies American charity.  
Moreover, this thesis contributes to the health care crowdfunding literature, by being the 
first study to identify and test whether the growing health care crowdfunding market is correcting 
for the market failures of the modern private health insurance market. Previous studies have 
focused on performance within specific medical needs like cancer treatments or transgender 
surgeries. However, this study takes a step back to broadly evaluate whether chronic diseases 
like cancer are getting more crowdfunding dollars in the first place. I find that chronic diseases, 
given the limitations of my research, are raising more funds than acute diseases. 
This research can be extended in three ways. First, I would be interested in seeing if a 
qualitative analysis or a controlled lab experiment would render different results in hypotheses 
testing the same hypotheses. Next, I would be interested in evaluating the role of perceived 
efficacy in motivating donation behavior to health care. What motivates people to decide that 
their donation to a certain cause will maximize the efficacy of their donation? Third, I would be 
interested in seeing whether income or the nature of the medical condition itself drives giving 
activity. That is, between the two groups that most need crowdfunding, which get more 
crowdfunding and why? 
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I conclude this thesis by joining the early health care crowdfunding researchers in calling 
for policy makers to not rely on health care crowdfunding as a means of solving the American 
health care problem. Crowdfunding markets are uncoordinated and perpetuate socioeconomic 
divisions that already limit care in the current private insurance market. Structural health care 
reform, coordinated by the government, is still necessary, because health care crowdfunding is 
not a sustainable nor equitable solution.  
  
Yang 69 
 
Bibliography 
 
“About Chronic Diseases.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services, 23 Oct. 2019, www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/about/index.htm. 
Andreoni, James, and Ragan Petrie. “Public Goods Experiments without Confidentiality: a 
Glimpse into Fund-Raising.” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88, no. 7-8, July 2004, 
pp. 1605–1623., doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00040-9. 
Andreoni, James. “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian 
Equivalence.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97, no. 6, Dec. 1989, pp. 1447–1458., 
doi:10.1086/261662. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care.” The American 
Economic Review, vol. 53, no. 5, Dec. 1963, pp. 141–149., 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2585909/pdf/15042238.pdf. 
Bassani, Gaia, et al. “Crowdfunding in Healthcare.” The Journal of Technology Transfer, vol. 
44, 20 Apr. 2018, pp. 1290–1310., doi:10.1007/s10961-018-9663-7. 
Bekkers, René, and Pamala Wiepking. “A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of 
Philanthropy.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 5, 2011, pp. 924–
973., doi:10.1177/0899764010380927. 
Bekkers, René, and Theo Schuyt. “And Who Is Your Neighbor? Explaining Denominational 
Differences in Charitable Giving and Volunteering in the Netherlands.” Review of 
Religious Research, vol. 50, no. 1, Sept. 2008, pp. 74–96., 
www.jstor.org/stable/20447529. 
Yang 70 
 
Bekkers, René. “Straight from the Heart.” Patients, Consumers and Civil Society, edited by 
Susan M. Chambré and Melinda Goldner, vol. 10, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 
2008, pp. 197–224. 
Berchick, Edward R., et al. Current Population Reports: Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States: 2018. U.S. Government Printing Office, 2019, pp. 1–21, Current 
Population Reports: Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2018. 
Berchick, Edward. “Who Are the Uninsured?” The United States Census Bureau, 12 Sept. 2018, 
www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/09/who-are-the-uninsured.html. 
Bluth, Rachel. “GoFundMe CEO: 'Gigantic Gaps' In Health System Showing Up In 
Crowdfunding.” Kaiser Health News, Kaiser Family Foundation, 16 Jan. 2019, 
khn.org/news/gofundme-ceo-gigantic-gaps-in-health-system-showing-up-in-
crowdfunding/. 
Brickman, Philip, and James H. Bryan. “Moral Judgment of Theft, Charity, and Third-Party 
Transfers That Increase or Decrease Equality.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 31, no. 1, 1975, pp. 156–161., doi:10.1037/h0076238. 
Burtch, Gordon, and Jason Chan. “Investigating the Relationship Between Medical 
Crowdfunding and Personal Bankruptcy in the United States: Evidence of A Digital 
Divide.” MIS Quarterly (Forthcoming), 8 July 2018, pp. 1–52., 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2676821. 
Chernew, Michael. “General Equilibrium and Marketability in the Health Care Industry.” 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 26, no. 5, 2001, pp. 885–898., 
doi:10.1215/03616878-26-5-885. 
Yang 71 
 
Chino, Fumiko, et al. “Out-of-Pocket Costs, Financial Distress, and Underinsurance in Cancer 
Care.” JAMA Oncology, vol. 3, no. 11, Aug. 2017, pp. 1582–1584., 
doi:10.1001/jamaoncol.2017.2148. 
Clotfelter, Charles T. “Charitable Giving and Tax Policy in the US.” Charitable Giving and Tax 
Policy, edited by Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais, 1st ed., Oxford University Press, 
2016, pp. 35–60. 
Crawford, Elizabeth, and Jeremy Jackson. “Philanthropy in the Millennial Age: Trends Toward 
Polycentric Personalized Philanthropy.” NDSU Public Choice and Private Enterprise 
Research Paper No. 18-4, Nov. 2018, pp. 1–28., doi:10.2139/ssrn.3285356. 
Crumpler, Heidi, and Philip J. Grossman. “An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving.” 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, no. 5-6, June 2008, pp. 1011–1021., 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.014. 
Cutler, David, and Richard Zeckhauser. “Adverse Selection in Health Insurance.” NBER 
Working Paper No. w6107, July 1997, pp. 1–29. 
Duncan, Brian. “A Theory of Impact Philanthropy.” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88, no. 9-
10, Aug. 2004, pp. 2159–2180., doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00037-9. 
Duynhoven, Alysha Van, et al. “Spatially Exploring the Intersection of Socioeconomic Status 
and Canadian Cancer-Related Medical Crowdfunding Campaigns.” BMJ Open, vol. 9, 
no. 6, 2019, pp. 1–9., doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026365. 
Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman. “Rebate versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize 
Charitable Contributions Matter?” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 87, no. 3-4, Mar. 
2003, pp. 681–701., doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00094-9. 
Yang 72 
 
Fang, Jing, et al. “Insurance Status Among Adults With Hypertension—The Impact of 
Underinsurance.” Journal of the American Heart Association, vol. 5, no. 12, 2016, pp. 1–
6., doi:10.1161/jaha.116.004313. 
Gerisch, Mary. “Health Care As a Human Right.” Human Rights Magazine, vol. 43, no. 3, 2018, 
www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-state-
of-healthcare-in-the-united-states/health-care-as-a-human-right/. 
Glied, Sherry A. “Health Insurance and Market Failure since Arrow.” Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law, vol. 26, no. 5, 2001, pp. 957–966., doi:10.1215/03616878-26-5-957. 
Gonzales, Amy L., et al. “‘Better Everyone Should Know Our Business than We Lose Our 
House’: Costs and Benefits of Medical Crowdfunding for Support, Privacy, and Identity.” 
New Media & Society, vol. 20, no. 2, Sept. 2016, pp. 641–658., 
doi:10.1177/1461444816667723. 
Gruber, Jonathan. “The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance.” National Tax 
Journal, vol. 62, no. 2.2, June 2011, pp. 511–530., www.ntanet.org/NTJ/64/2/ntj-
v64n02p511-30-tax-exclusion-for-employer.pdf. 
Harbaugh, William T., et al. “Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal 
Motives for Charitable Donations.” Science, vol. 316, no. 5831, 2007, pp. 1622–1625., 
doi:10.1126/science.1140738. 
Igel, Lee H. “When Did Health Care Become a Campaign Issue?” Society, vol. 45, Dec. 2008, 
pp. 512–514., doi:10.1007/s12115-008-9151-z. 
Independent Sector. “Giving and Volunteering [United States].” Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, 2016. 
Yang 73 
 
Jensen, Carsten, and Michael B. Petersen. “The Deservingness Heuristic and the Politics of 
Health Care.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 61, no. 1, 9 May 2016, pp. 68–
83., doi:10.1111/ajps.12251. 
Keshner, Andrew. “The Desperate Michigan Woman Who Used GoFundMe to Help Pay for a 
Heart Transplant Is Far from Alone.” MarketWatch, 27 Nov. 2018, 
www.marketwatch.com/story/a-desperate-michigan-woman-turned-to-gofundme-to-help-
pay-for-her-heart-transplant-2018-11-27. 
Kiley, Jocelyn. “60% In US Say Health Care Coverage Is Government's Responsibility.” Pew 
Research Center, 3 Oct. 2018, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/03/most-
continue-to-say-ensuring-health-care-coverage-is-governments-responsibility/. 
Kirzinger, Ashley, et al. “Data Note: Americans’ Challenges with Health Care Costs.” The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 11 June 2019, www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-
brief/data-note-americans-challenges-health-care-costs/. 
Kshetri, Nir. “Success of Crowd-Based Online Technology in Fundraising: An Institutional 
Perspective.” Journal of International Management, vol. 21, no. 2, June 2015, pp. 100–
116., doi:10.1016/j.intman.2015.03.004. 
Lee, Anthony, et al. “Spatially Exploring the Intersection of Socioeconomic Status and Canadian 
Cancer-Related Medical Crowdfunding Campaigns.” BMJ Open, vol. 9, 2019, pp. 1–10., 
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026365. 
Lindskold, Svenn, et al. “The Effects of Directness of Face-to-Face Requests and Sex of 
Solicitor on Streetcorner Donations.” The Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 101, no. 1, 
1977, pp. 45–51., doi:10.1080/00224545.1977.9923982. 
Yang 74 
 
Liptak, Adam, and Abby Goodnough. “Supreme Court to Hear Obamacare Appeal.” The New 
York Times, 2 Mar. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/us/supreme-court-obamacare-
appeal.html. 
Liptak, Adam. “Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law, 5-4, in Victory for Obama.” The New 
York Times, 28 June 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-lets-health-
law-largely-stand.html. 
Loewenstein, George, et al. “Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance.” Journal of 
Health Economics, vol. 32, no. 5, 27 June 2013, pp. 850–862., 
doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.04.004. 
Lukk, Martin, et al. “Worthy? Crowdfunding the Canadian Health Care and Education Sectors.” 
Canadian Review of Sociology, vol. 55, no. 3, 2018, pp. 404–424., 
doi:10.1111/cars.12210. 
Lunden, Ingrid. “GoFundMe Acquires YouCaring as Charitable Crowdfunding Continues to 
Consolidate.” TechCrunch, Verizon Media, 3 Apr. 2018, 
techcrunch.com/2018/04/03/gofundme-acquires-youcaring-as-charitable-crowdfunding-
continues-to-consolidate/. 
Manchikanti, Laxmaiah, et al. “Evolution of US Health Care Reform.” Pain Physician, vol. 20, 
2017, pp. 107–110., 
www.painphysicianjournal.com/current/pdf?article=NDMwMQ%3D%3D&journal=104. 
“McCarran-Ferguson Act of (1945).” Law Library - American Law and Legal Information, 
law.jrank.org/pages/8497/McCarran-Ferguson-Act-1945.html. 
Merrill, Jacqueline P. “From Hobbes to Hayek: Perspectives on Civil Society and Philanthropy.” 
The Independent Review, vol. 23, no. 4, 2019, pp. 489–501. 
Yang 75 
 
“Most Americans Say the High Costs of Medical Treatments Are a Big Problem.” Pew Research 
Center, 6 July 2018, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/americans-are-closely-
divided-over-value-of-medical-treatments-but-most-agree-costs-are-a-big-problem/ft_18-
06-28_medicaltreatment_most-americans-high-costs/. 
Muehleman, J. T., et al. “The Generosity Shift.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
vol. 34, no. 3, 1976, pp. 344–351., doi:10.1037/0022-3514.34.3.344. 
Newport, Frank. “Top Issues for Voters: Healthcare, Economy, Immigration.” Gallup.com, 
Gallup, 2 Nov. 2018, news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issues-voters-healthcare-
economy-immigration.aspx. 
“NHE Fact Sheet.” CMS, U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 24 Mar. 2020, 
www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet. 
Null, Clair. “Warm Glow, Information, and Inefficient Charitable Giving.” Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 95, no. 5-6, June 2011, pp. 455–465., 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.018. 
 “President Truman's Fight for National Health Insurance, 1949-1953.” Harry S. Truman Library 
& Museum, National Archives and Records Administration, 
www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/online-collections/fight-for-national-health-insurance. 
Renwick, Matthew J., and Elias Mossialos. “Crowdfunding Our Health: Economic Risks and 
Benefits.” Social Science & Medicine, vol. 191, Oct. 2017, pp. 48–56., 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.08.035. 
“Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2018 - May 2019.” Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 28 May 2019, 
Yang 76 
 
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-
2018-dealing-with-unexpected-expenses.htm. 
“THE RESULT OF OBSERVATIONS MADE UPON THE DISEASES WHICH OCCURRED 
IN THE Military Hospitals of the United States, DURING THE LATE WAR.” Medical 
Inquiries and Observations, by Benjamin Rush, Prichard & Hall, 1793, pp. 180–185, 
quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N17140.0001.001/1:20?rgn=div1;view=fulltext. 
 “The Role of the Federal Government in Health and Earlier Healthcare Efforts.” Healthcare 
Reform in America: A Reference Handbook, by Jennie J. Kronenfeld and Michael R. 
Kronenfeld, 1st ed., ABC-Clio, 2004, pp. 8–40. 
Roubein, Rachel. “TIMELINE: The GOP's Failed Effort to Repeal ObamaCare.” The Hill, 
Capitol Hill Publishing Corp., 26 Sept. 2017, thehill.com/policy/healthcare/other/352587-
timeline-the-gop-effort-to-repeal-and-replace-obamacare. 
Shi, Jingyuan, and Charles T. Salmon. “Identifying Opinion Leaders to Promote Organ Donation 
on Social Media: Network Study.” Journal of Medical Internet Research, vol. 20, no. 1, 
2018, pp. 1–13., doi:10.2196/jmir.7643. 
Simon, Adam F. “Television News and International Earthquake Relief.” Journal of 
Communication, vol. 47, no. 3, Sept. 1997, pp. 82–93., doi:10.1111/j.1460-
2466.1997.tb02718.x. 
Small, Deborah A., and Uri Simonsohn. “Friends of Victims: Personal Experience and Prosocial 
Behavior.” Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 35, no. 3, Oct. 2008, pp. 532–542., 
doi:10.1086/527268. 
Yang 77 
 
Snyder, Jeremy. “Crowdfunding FOR MEDICAL CARE: Ethical Issues in an Emerging Health 
Care Funding Practice.” Hastings Center Report, vol. 46, no. 6, 2016, pp. 36–42., 
doi:10.1002/hast.645. 
“Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 13 Mar. 2020, www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-
expansion-decisions-interactive-map/. 
Sugden, Robert. “On the Economics of Philanthropy.” The Economic Journal, vol. 92, no. 366, 1 
June 1982, pp. 341–350., doi:10.2307/2232444. 
Szmigiera, M. “Global Crowdfunding Market Size 2018 and 2025.” Statista, 3 Dec. 2019, 
www.statista.com/statistics/1078273/global-crowdfunding-market-size/. 
“The Uninsured And The Difference Health Insurance Makes.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 1 Sept. 2012, www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/the-uninsured-and-the-
difference-health-insurance/. 
The United States Census Bureau. “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United 
States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 (NST-EST2019-
01).” 2019. 
United States, Congress, Cong. House, Committee of Conference. “Internal Revenue Code of 
1954.” Internal Revenue Code of 1954, U.S. Government Printing Office, 83AD, pp. 1–
86. 83rd Congress, 2nd session, report 2543. 
United States, Congress, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 2010. U.S. 
Government Publishing Office Congress. 
Yang 78 
 
Wagner, Carl, and Ladd Wheeler. “Model, Need, and Cost Effects in Helping Behavior.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 12, no. 2, 1969, pp. 111–116., 
doi:10.1037/h0027569. 
Warr, Peter G. “Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity.” Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 19, no. 1, Oct. 1982, pp. 131–138., doi:10.1016/0047-2727(82)90056-1. 
Weisbrod, Burton  A., and Robert  J. Feiser. “Hospitalization Insurance and Hospital 
Utilization.” The American Economic Review, vol. 51, 1961, pp. 126–132. 
Wilper, Andrew P., et al. “A National Study of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Access to Care 
in Uninsured U.S. Adults.” Annals of Internal Medicine, vol. 149, no. 3, 5 Aug. 2008, pp. 
170–176., doi:10.7326/0003-4819-149-3-200808050-00006. 
